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The Supreme Court has increasingly considered a particular kind of argument: that it should avoid reaching decisions that would “open the floodgates of
litigation.” Despite its frequent invocation, there has been little scholarly exploration of what a floodgates argument truly means, and even less discussion of its
normative basis. This Article addresses both subjects, demonstrating for the first
time the scope and surprising variation of floodgates arguments, as well as uncovering their sometimes-shaky foundations. Relying on in-depth case studies from a
wide array of issue areas, the Article shows that floodgates arguments primarily
have been used to protect three institutions: coordinate branches of government, the
state courts, and the federal courts themselves. In the former two instances, the
Court’s desire to avoid floods is supported by independent constitutional principles
and doctrine, including separation of powers and federalism, lending these kinds
of arguments a prima facie legitimacy. With regard to the final instance, however,
the Court has relied on floodgates arguments solely to protect itself and the rest of
the federal judiciary from what it sees as an excessive workload, raising difficult
questions about separation of powers and the measures courts can take to ensure
their ability to administer justice. The Article concludes by arguing for a presumption against court-centered floodgates arguments—positing that the Court should
let the lower courts rely on alternative mechanisms, such as procedural rules and
case-management techniques, to handle new claims instead of closing the courthouse doors to stave them off altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has increasingly considered a particular kind of argument: that it
should avoid reaching decisions that would “open the floodgates
of litigation.”1 Of the sixty or so cases in which the justices explicitly raised or addressed a so-called floodgates argument,2
fourteen came between 2010 and 2013 alone.3 And yet, despite
1
Although a floodgates argument appears in the Supreme Court as early as 1908
in Ex parte Young, 209 US 123, 166–67 (1908), the Court does not appear to consider this
kind of argument consistently until the mid-1940s. See, for example, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd v United States, 325 US 212, 225 (1945) (Douglas dissenting); United
States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 US 533, 583 (1944) (Stone dissenting). That said, floodgates arguments have existed outside the Court for far longer. Within the United States, the earliest recorded use of the phrase “the floodgates of litigation”
comes from Whitbeck v Cook, 15 Johnson Cas 483, 491 (NY Sup Ct 1818). See also Adam
Freedman, The Party of the First Part: The Curious World of Legalese 73 (Henry Holt
2007). Outside the United States, this kind of argument can be found in judicial opinions
as early as the late 1700s. See Governor and Company of the British Cast Plate Manufacturers v Meredith, 100 Eng Rep 1306, 1307 (1792) (Kenyon) (“If this action could be
maintained, every Turnpike Act, Paving Act and Navigation Act, would give rise to an
infinity of actions.”).
2
For a brief discussion of how I determined the relevant set of cases, see note 31.
3
See McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct 1924, 1943 (2013) (Scalia dissenting); Johnson v Williams, 133 S Ct 1088, 1097 (2013); id at 1102 (Scalia concurring); Henderson v
United States, 133 S Ct 1121, 1130 (2013); Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v United States, 133 S Ct 511, 521 (2012); Mohamad v Palestinian Authority, 132 S Ct 1702,
1711 (2012) (Breyer concurring); Lafler v Cooper, 132 S Ct 1376, 1389–90 (2012); Mims v
Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 132 S Ct 740, 753 (2012); Perry v New Hampshire, 132 S
Ct 716, 737–38 (2012) (Sotomayor dissenting); Connick v Thompson, 131 S Ct 1350, 1382
n 17 (2011) (Ginsburg dissenting); Skinner v Switzer, 131 S Ct 1289, 1299–1300 (2011);
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the increased prominence of this line of reasoning, its normative
justification has been highly contested. Indeed, recent cases
show the justices vacillating between providing assurances that
their decision will not result in a deluge of new claims,4 and accusing each other of being driven by an improper desire to stave
off such a deluge.5 In the words of Justice Ginsburg from her
dissent in the 2007 case Wilkie v Robbins,6 “The ‘floodgates’ argument the Court today embraces has been rehearsed and rejected before.”7
It is no wonder that members of the Court have wrestled
with questions of whether and when to rely upon floodgates reasoning. In its most distilled form, a floodgates argument is an
argument against a particular decision on the ground that it will
lead to a large number of new claims.8 At first blush, that the
McDonald v City of Chicago, Illinois, 130 S Ct 3020, 3115 (2010) (Stevens dissenting);
Jerman v Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S Ct 1605, 1620 (2010);
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA v Allstate Insurance Co, 130 S Ct 1431, 1472 n 14
(2010) (Ginsburg dissenting); Padilla v Kentucky, 130 S Ct 1473, 1484–85 (2010).
4
See, for example, Mims, 132 S Ct at 753 (“Arrow’s floodgates argument assumes
a shocking degree of noncompliance with the [Telephone Consumer Protection] Act and
seems to us more imaginary than real.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Lafler,
132 S Ct at 1389 (“Petitioner argues that implementing a remedy here will open the
floodgates to litigation by defendants seeking to unsettle their convictions. Petitioner’s
concern is misplaced.”); Padilla, 130 S Ct at 1484–85 (“We confronted a similar ‘floodgates’ concern in Hill . . . . A flood did not follow in that decision’s wake.”), citing Hill v
Lockhart, 474 US 52, 58 (1985).
5
See, for example, Wilkie v Robbins, 551 US 537, 569 (2007) (Ginsburg concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court rejects his claim, for it fears the consequences. Allowing Robbins to pursue this suit, the Court maintains, would open the
floodgates to a host of unworthy suits ‘in every sphere of legitimate governmental action
affecting property interests.’”); Schriro v Landrigan, 550 US 465, 499 (2007) (Stevens
dissenting) (“In the end, the Court’s decision can only be explained by its increasingly
familiar effort to guard the floodgates of litigation.”); Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267, 326
n 14 (2004) (Stevens dissenting) (“The plurality’s reluctance to recognize the justiciability of partisan gerrymanders seems driven in part by a fear that recognizing such claims
will give rise to a flood of litigation.”).
6
551 US 537 (2007).
7
Id at 577 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8
See, for example, Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 Mont L Rev 59, 73 (2001) (defining a “‘floodgates of
litigation’ argument” as one that “asserts that a proposed rule, if adopted, will inundate
the court with lawsuits”).
To be clear, the Court of course routinely considers arguments that touch on concerns about future litigation, such as parade of horribles and slippery slope arguments.
See notes 36–37. For my own part, I see the consideration of these arguments often as
attempts by the justices to test their legal principles through a kind of reflective equilibrium—seeing whether they can support the same principle when faced with a different
set of facts. In this way, unlike floodgates arguments, these other arguments are not consequentialist. Regardless, a full examination of all Supreme Court arguments regarding
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Court would try to hold back a flood of litigation seems reasonable, particularly in an era in which the lower courts have been
said to face “a crisis in volume.”9 And yet, as one plumbs deeper,
the argument becomes increasingly problematic. Taken directly,
this line of reasoning would have the Court consider as part of
its substantive analysis the volume of litigation its decision
might create. Members of the Court often repeat the famed
phrase that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury.”10 Granting a floodgates
argument implies that one’s “protection of the laws” depends, at
least in part, on a speculation about how many others intend to
claim that same protection.
What therefore appears as a straightforward argument in
fact brings with it a host of normative questions—questions that
legal scholars for the most part have not answered, and indeed
have not asked,11 even as some floodgates arguments have
shaped substantive law.12 Is it ever appropriate for courts to consider the effect their decision will have on the volume of litigation?
future litigation is outside the scope of this Article; rather, the focus here is on those arguments that appear to be particularly concerned with volume—namely, over the number of cases that any one decision might cause.
9
Scholars have used this particular phrase from the mid-1970s to today. See Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Courts: Staff and Process in the Crisis of Volume 7–9 (West
1974); Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv L Rev 1109, 1112 (2011).
10 This phrase originated with Chief Justice Marshall. See Marbury v Madison, 5
US (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Although Marbury itself presented an instance of a legal
injury that did not result in a remedy from the Court, justices have frequently invoked
the phrase in a literal way. See, for example, Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 812 (1999)
(Souter dissenting); Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun
dissenting); Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
US 388, 397 (1971); Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 208 (1962).
11 The discussion of floodgates has received surprisingly little attention from legal
academics. A limited number of scholars have discussed this line of argumentation in
articles on other topics or in practical guides. See, for example, Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich L Rev 2271, 2326–30 (1990) (discussing the floodgates argument in the context of affirmative and negative constitutional duties); Margolis, 62 Mont L Rev at 73 (cited in note 8) (including information on floodgates arguments
in a guide on writing appellate briefs). However, the only scholarship completely devoted
to the topic of which I am aware is a thoughtful student comment. See generally Toby J.
Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation”, 6 U Pa J
Con L 377 (2003).
12 To be clear, I am not claiming that floodgates arguments have been dispositive in
all or even most of the cases in which they have been raised. Rather, I am asserting that
this kind of reasoning has directly impacted the outcome of at least a few key cases. See,
for example, Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc v Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,
545 US 308, 319–20 (2005); Wilkie, 551 US at 562. And it has at least been a relevant
factor in many of the cases discussed in Parts I, II, and III.
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If so, what number of forecasted filings is sufficient to justify,
say, deciding against the creation of a new private right of action
or against reviewing a set of cases? Does it matter whether a
high percentage of the anticipated claims would be frivolous?
Does it matter just how inundated the courts, or other governmental institutions, are with other cases?
Yet to begin to have purchase on these questions, one first
needs to understand how floodgates arguments are made and to
what end. Despite the fact that the Court refers to the “floodgates argument” as if it had a singular meaning13 and uses consistent imagery to invoke it—a flood,14 a deluge,15 a rainfall,16 or
even an avalanche17—not all such arguments are the same. A
careful exposition of floodgates arguments reveals that they are
in fact quite varied, depending largely upon the government institution—and the dynamic between the judiciary and that institution—that would be affected by an increase in litigation.

13 See, for example, Wilkie, 551 US at 577 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The ‘floodgates’ argument the Court today embraces has been rehearsed and rejected before.”). It is worth noting that on at least one occasion, the Court
has used the phrase to mean something akin to a slippery slope argument. See Morris v
Gressette, 432 US 491, 506 n 23 (1977):

Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissent opens with a “floodgates” argument: If there is
no judicial review when the Attorney General misunderstands his legal duty,
there also will be no judicial review when at sometime in the future the Attorney General bargains acquiescence in a discriminatory change in a covered
State’s voting laws in return for that State’s electoral votes.
The discussion here includes only those arguments centered on the potential for increased litigation. Additionally, at least among lower courts, there have been instances
in which a floodgates argument is invoked in a positive manner, with the court welcoming a potential increase in litigation on a particular subject (with thanks to Professor
Richard Lazarus for this point). See, for example, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Commission v United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F2d 1109, 1111 (DC Cir 1971). In
the Supreme Court, I only found cases in which a flood was perceived to be a threat; as
such, the discussion here only focuses on the concerns—and not the promise—of potential litigation.
14 See, for example, Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US 667,
680 n 11 (1986) (“We do not believe that our decision will open the floodgates to millions
of Part B Medicare claims. . . . We observed no flood of litigation in the first 20 years of
operation of Part B of the Medicare program, and we seriously doubt that we will be inundated in the future.”).
15 See, for example, Davis v Passman, 442 US 228, 248 (1979) (dismissing the lower
court’s concern of “deluging federal courts with claims”).
16 See, for example, Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299 (“[N]o evidence . . . shows any litigation flood or even rainfall.”).
17 See, for example, Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting) (criticizing the
Court’s decision for “open[ing] the door for another avalanche of new federal cases”).
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To begin, the Court has consistently considered floodgates
arguments in the context of interbranch concerns. With regard
to the executive branch, justices have suggested that their decisions must take into account the ways in which an increase in
certain kinds of litigation would impinge upon the ability of federal agents18 or even the President19 to perform official obligations. With regard to the legislative branch, justices have raised
concerns that a particular statutory reading might lead to a deluge of new claims, a result that would suggest the Court had
disregarded congressional intent20 or even usurped the legislative function by expanding its own jurisdiction.21 In both sets of
cases, the primary concern is not that the federal courts will be
inundated with an increase in claims but rather that an increase
in claims would cause, or be evidence of, a problem for a coordinate branch of government.
Similarly, the Court has considered floodgates arguments
that are part of larger “intersystemic”22 concerns—those regarding the balance between the federal and state court systems. In
these cases, the threat of a flood is problematic because it would
signal federal aggrandizement—that the Court had taken cases
from the state courts that belong in state court23 or that the
state courts would be burdened with a host of new claims and
attendant obligations.24 As in the interbranch context, the concern here is not over the volume of cases per se but rather how
an increase in cases would affect another set of government institutions and the federal courts’ dynamic with those institutions.
In the majority of cases, however, the justices have considered floodgates arguments that are animated by volume-related
concerns for the federal judiciary, so that they may keep their
own heads (and those of other federal judges) above water. In
this set of cases, members of the Court argue for a particular decision to avoid creating or contributing to what they see to be an
excessive workload in what might best be understood as a form

18

See id (Blackmun dissenting).
See Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681, 722–23 (1997) (Breyer concurring).
20 See De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 223–25 (Douglas dissenting).
21 See Solem v Helm, 463 US 277, 314–15 (1983) (Burger dissenting).
22 Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L J 1898, 1990–97 (2011).
23 See United States v Maze, 414 US 395, 407 (1974) (Burger dissenting).
24 M.L.B. v S.L.J., 519 US 102, 129–30 (1996) (Thomas dissenting) (describing how,
as a result of the Court’s decision, state courts would be required to furnish free trial
transcripts in numerous kinds of cases).
19
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of “court-centered prudentialism.”25 Specifically, the justices occasionally suggest or even hold that a cause of action must go
unrecognized,26 or a case unreviewed,27 because to do otherwise
would invite too many new filings into the federal courts. More
frequently, the majority asserts that its holding is sound because it will not lead to an increase in claims,28 or the dissent accuses the majority of being improperly motivated by a desire to
avoid such an increase.29 In essence, this kind of floodgates argument is concerned with case volume, and how that volume
will affect the federal courts themselves.
Given that the Court considers floodgates arguments in
such fundamentally different ways, these arguments must be
evaluated contextually, not categorically.30 This Article therefore
begins by analyzing how floodgates arguments actually function
in the Supreme Court.31 Following other scholarship that has

25 See Neil S. Siegel, Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 Duke J Const
L & Pub Pol 16, 16–17 (2010).
26 See Wilkie, 551 US at 555–61.
27 See Vieth, 541 US at 326 n 14 (Stevens dissenting).
28 See note 4.
29 See note 5.
30 Consider Note, Satisfying the “Appearance of Justice”: The Uses of Apparent Impropriety in Constitutional Adjudication, 117 Harv L Rev 2708 (2004) (suggesting that
apparent-impropriety concerns should be determined contextually rather than
categorically).
31 To find the universe of cases containing floodgates arguments in the Supreme
Court, I first ran a search in Westlaw in the winter of 2013 for all Supreme Court cases
containing the word “flood,” “floodgate,” “floodgates,” “deluge,” or “avalanche”—which
resulted in approximately 650 cases. I reviewed the operative language in each case to
determine which ones were relevant, and narrowed the pool to approximately sixty cases. A research assistant then conducted tailored searches (such as “floodgates” within
five words of “cases” or “litigation”) as a check against my own winnowing of the cases.
Second, recognizing that not all cases that rely upon floodgates reasoning use the explicit
language of floodgates, I ran another series of searches designed to capture at least some
of the cases in which the Court discussed the impact a decision would have on case volume (such as “staggering” or “tremendous” within five words of “cases” or “litigation”).
Finally, I ran searches using certain excerpts from what appeared to be key opinions
that addressed floodgates arguments (such as Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Bivens
and Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Brown v Allen). See Bivens, 403 US at 410 (Harlan
concurring); Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson concurring). Including
these additional searches, the total number of relevant cases that I located was just
above sixty. I performed this same set of searches in the summer of 2013 and added one
new case from October Term 2012 (McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct 1924 (2013)).
To be clear, I do not purport that every Supreme Court case that mentions case volume as a concern is captured in this set; for example, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v
Thompson, 478 US 804 (1986), or, more recently, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v Nassar, 133 S Ct 2517 (2013), could have been included in this analysis but
were not captured by my search. Rather, the claim is simply that I have captured a
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focused on a particular kind of argument in legal discourse,32
this Article’s initial goal is to unpack the argument in question—determining how floodgates arguments are employed, for
what purposes, and what impact they have had in shaping doctrine. As the discussion above indicates, the answers to those
questions are varied and important. These answers also enable
the second major project of the Article, which is to begin to evaluate the normative basis underlying floodgates arguments—
whether and under what circumstances they should play a role
in judicial decision making.
The first three Parts of the Article delineate the primary uses of this consequentialist line of reasoning, based on why the
reasoning is being invoked and which branch of government will
be affected by the consequences.33 Part I examines cases in
which the Court considers floodgates arguments in the service of
a larger argument about interbranch concerns. Specifically, Part
I.A focuses on judicial-executive interactions, and Part I.B turns
to judicial-legislative interactions. Part II considers floodgates
arguments as they implicate intersystemic concerns. Part II.A
examines cases in which the Court is concerned about taking too
many cases from the state courts, and Part II.B discusses the
near opposite—cases in which the Court is concerned about
flooding the state courts with too many cases and related obligations. Part III then assesses cases in which the Court invokes
floodgates out of concern for the judiciary itself. This Part explores how this reasoning has been raised in particular lines of
sizeable number of cases that address this kind of reasoning, including most if not all
explicit floodgates cases.
32 For a prime example of this type of scholarly literature, see generally Eugene
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv L Rev 1026 (2003) (providing a
detailed exposition of slippery slope arguments). For related scholarship, see generally
Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal L Rev 1051 (2000) (exploring
the use of the rationality assumption in legal scholarship); Gluck, 120 Yale L J 1898 (cited in note 22) (analyzing the Erie doctrine in a decade’s worth of federal and state court
cases).
33 As with any time one creates a taxonomy to better understand a set, one could
rely on a different organizing principle (just as if one were examining a collection of various shapes in different colors, one could group the items by shape or by color, etc.). Regarding the set of floodgates cases, one could alternatively create a schematic that focused on the task the Court was performing in each case—say, constitutional
interpretation, statutory interpretation, or federal common lawmaking. For my own
part, I think the affected institution is a critical component of understanding floodgates
arguments and so focus the discussion accordingly. That said, I do try to note the kind of
task the Court was engaging in throughout the discussion and raise the task, where I
think relevant, in the normative discussion in Part IV.
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cases, including Bivens, habeas, and prisoner appeals. In these
and other areas of law, the Court seeks to avoid increasing the
number of claims coming into the federal courts—often frivolous
cases but also cases in general.
Part IV then frames and begins to answer the normative
questions of if and when the Court should employ this line of
reasoning. I suggest that the concerns behind the first two categories of floodgates arguments are familiar ones, with ties to
constitutional principles—including separation of powers and
federalism—and key lines of doctrine—including qualified immunity and abstention. Although reasonable minds may disagree about how much weight to accord these floodgates arguments, their invocation generally is not problematic per se.
Whether the Court can properly shape substantive law
based on caseload for caseload’s sake—a matter of judicial
“self-interest[ ]”34—is a more complicated question. Whereas concerns about interbranch and intersystemic relationships have a
firm footing in various areas of law, concerns about workload
stand on shakier ground. Accordingly, I argue that anxieties
about workload are best addressed through other means, such
as through the use of procedural rules and case-management
practices.35 Inviting a flood of new claims into federal court may
well be dangerous. But without sound legal footing, it is more
dangerous still to divert a line of cases where it would not otherwise flow.
I. INTERBRANCH CONCERNS
The phrase “opening the floodgates” has become something of a legal trope, like “slippery slope” 36 or “parade of

34

See Hudson v McMillian, 503 US 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun concurring).
I use the term “case-management practices” to describe administrative means
that the federal courts of appeals employ to manage their dockets, such as decreasing the
percentage of cases that receive oral argument and result in published opinions. See, for
example, Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 Duke L J 315, 320–25 (2011).
36 See, for example, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA v Allstate Insurance Co,
130 S Ct 1431, 1465–66 n 5 (2010) (Ginsburg dissenting):
35

Shady Grove projects that a dispensation in favor of Allstate would require
“courts in all diversity class actions . . . [to] look to state rules and decisional
law rather than to Rule 23 . . . in making their class certification decisions.”
This slippery-slope projection is both familiar and false. Cf. R. Bork, The
Tempting of America 169 (1990) (“Judges and lawyers live on the slippery slope
of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom.”).
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horribles.”37 Judges and scholars tend to use the phrase as if it
had a single, stable meaning.38 But in fact, these arguments vary
considerably depending upon the government institution—and
the dynamic between the judiciary and that institution—that
would be affected by a flood of new cases.

(citations omitted). For a broader discussion of slippery slope arguments, see generally
Volokh, 116 Harv L Rev 1026 (cited in note 32).
37 See, for example, Eastern Associated Coal Corp v United Mine Workers of America, District 17, 531 US 57, 69 (2000) (Scalia concurring) (“One can, of course, summon up
a parade of horribles, such as an arbitration award ordering an airline to reinstate an
alcoholic pilot who somehow escapes being grounded by force of law.”); Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503, 519 (1986) (Brennan dissenting):
[T]he Air Force argues that while Dr. Goldman describes his yarmulke as an
“unobtrusive” addition to his uniform, obtrusiveness is a purely relative,
standardless judgment. The Government notes that while a yarmulke might
not seem obtrusive to a Jew, neither does a turban to a Sikh, a saffron robe to a
Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi, nor dreadlocks to a Rastafarian. If the
Court were to require the Air Force to permit yarmulkes, the service must also
allow all of these other forms of dress and grooming. The Government dangles
before the Court a classic parade of horribles . . . .
Most recently, the parade of horribles was recast as “the broccoli horrible” by dissenting
Justices in October Term 2011’s decision on the Affordable Care Act. See National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566, 2624 (2012) (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38 For recent judicial examples, see Geinosky v City of Chicago, 675 F3d 743, 748
(7th Cir 2012) (“We do not credit the city’s assertion that allowing this suit will open the
floodgates to a wave of ordinary malicious prosecution (or other tort cases) brought as
constitutional class-of-one claims.”); United States v City of Loveland, Ohio, 621 F3d 465,
472 (6th Cir 2010) (“Because federal courts are already charged with enforcing the Clean
Water Act . . . the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over this matter would not open
the floodgates of litigation that might overwhelm the federal courts.”); Arar v Ashcroft,
585 F3d 559, 629–30 n 7 (2d Cir 2009) (Pooler dissenting):
Because plaintiffs must meet a plausibility standard for claims against federal
officials under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I am not concerned that subjecting federal officials to liability under the [Torture Victim Protection Act] would open the
floodgates to a wave of meritless litigation.
(citation omitted).
For recent scholarly examples, see F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106
Nw U L Rev 55, 89 (2012) (“A fourth objection to expanding standing to all risks of injury
is that it would open the floodgates of litigation and overburden the federal dockets.”);
Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 Vand L Rev 509, 555 (2012) (“One might be concerned . . . about
opening the floodgates of federal court litigation. The argument that there are simply too
many federal question cases for the federal courts to handle is somewhat responsive to
this point.”); Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek behind the Curtains, 100 Georgetown L J 1507,
1516 (2012) (“In the context of litigation, a ‘flood’ is normally treated as something to be
avoided—it is common to argue that a particular legal theory should be rejected because
its embrace would ‘open the floodgates of litigation.’”).
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Chief among these institutions are the judiciary’s own coordinate branches of the federal government: the executive and
the legislature. Indeed, in quite a few cases the Supreme Court
has considered floodgates arguments that address an interbranch concern. The concerns themselves vary, depending on the
branch involved. In the context of cases involving the executive,
the worry has been that a flood of litigation would burden executive branch actors—be it federal agents or the president himself.
In the context of the legislature, the concern is substantially different. There, the worry is not that a deluge of new claims would
encumber Congress but rather that it would serve as evidence
that the Court had disregarded legislative intent in construing a
particular statute or had even usurped the legislative function
altogether. Despite these specific variations, the larger point is
that the Court has relied upon floodgates arguments to express
concerns about how an increase in claims would affect its relationship with a coordinate branch of government.
A.

Burdening the Executive Branch

The justices have occasionally entertained, and even invoked sua sponte, floodgates arguments when considering the
impact their decisions will have on executive branch officials.
Although litigation always absorbs defendants’ time and resources, members of the Court have suggested that these costs
may be particularly problematic when the defendants are executive officials, because of both the importance of their work and
the troubling potential for judicial micromanaging of executive
time and functions. These concerns are perhaps most prominent
in cases involving civil suits against executive officials, and a
close reading of those cases demonstrates both the form and
weight of floodgates considerations.
One of the first examples of a floodgates argument used to
express a concern about burdening the executive comes from
Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics39 in 1971. In Bivens, the Court considered whether a
citizen has a cause of action against federal agents who violated
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable
search and seizure.40 Although a majority answered that question in the affirmative, several Justices dissented on the ground
39
40

403 US 388 (1971).
Id at 389–90.
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that Congress, not the Court, had the authority to create a new
cause of action.41 For this reason Bivens is often perceived as a
case that raises judicial-legislative concerns.42 And yet, the
floodgates argument that was ultimately put forward by a third
dissenter expressed a concern about a different branch of government: unduly burdening the executive.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun objected on the ground
that the Court’s decision would “open[ ] the door for another avalanche of new federal cases.”43 Specifically, he argued that after
Bivens, “[w]henever a suspect imagines, or chooses to assert,
that a Fourth Amendment right has been violated, he will now
immediately sue the federal officer in federal court.”44 Justice
Blackmun envisioned federal agents being burdened with a barrage of litigation, thereby making it all the more difficult for
them to carry out their official duties.45 There was also an indirect fear that the very threat of a litigation avalanche would
cause agents to alter appropriate behavior out of a broad fear of
being sued.46 These concerns were particularly pronounced at
“this time of our history”47—a time when law enforcement officials were perceived to be under great strain.48
Significantly, this early example of a floodgates argument is
not concerned with flooding the courts with cases. Rather, the
potential flood here is one that would burden executive branch

41 See id at 411 (Burger dissenting); id at 427–28 (Black dissenting). See also
James E. Pfander and David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 Georgetown L J 117, 117–18 (2009).
42 See, for example, Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is Special about Special Factors, 45 Ind L Rev 719, 729
(2012) (describing the “common understanding of Bivens’s central problem” to be “one of
the separation of judicial from legislative powers”).
43 Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting).
44 Id (Blackmun dissenting).
45 See id (Blackmun dissenting) (“This will tend to stultify proper law enforcement
and to make the day’s labor for the honest and conscientious officer even more onerous
and more critical.”).
46 This view was expressed by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion. Id at 429
(Black dissenting) (“There is also a real danger that such suits might deter officials from
the proper and honest performance of their duties.”).
47 Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting).
48 Just prior to Bivens, the United States had experienced a rise in crime rates. See
Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics (Mar 29, 2010), online at
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (visited Sept
10, 2013) (reporting that both the violent crime rate and the property crime rate more
than doubled between 1960 and 1970); Carol S. Steiker, Book Review, Capital Punishment and Contingency, 125 Harv L Rev 760, 769 (2012) (noting the “rising crime rates
during the 1960s”).
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officials. What is also significant about Bivens is that, rather
than dismissing the validity of the concern, the majority tried to
refute the possibility that an avalanche would ensue. Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, cited a survey of “comparable
actions against state officers” and found only fifty-three reported
cases in seventeen years that survived a motion to dismiss.49
While it is unclear whether this rejoinder sufficiently addresses
Justice Blackmun’s floodgates argument,50 what is clear is that
the majority thought that argument was important enough to
warrant a response.
Federal agents are not the only executive officials the Court
has considered protecting from floods; the Court has also considered such arguments in the context of how litigation would affect the president. The primary example of this concern comes
from Clinton v Jones,51 in which the Court considered, inter alia,
whether the federal courts must stay private actions against a
sitting President until he is no longer in office.52 Part of President Bill Clinton’s argument was that if the Court did not stay
private actions against him, he would be flooded with cases,
which would severely hinder his ability to perform his official
functions.53
The invocation of this argument is perhaps unsurprising,
but the Court’s response to it is especially interesting, for it illuminates the justices’ view of whether floods are valid concerns,
and also how parties can go about demonstrating their would-be
existence. As a general matter, there are two main responses to
a floodgates argument. First, as in Bivens, the Court can respond internally and refute the claim that a flood will come.54
Second, the Court can go outside of the argument and suggest
that the existence of a deluge of new claims, or lack thereof, is
not sufficient to determine the outcome of the case. In Jones, the
Court did both.
49

Bivens, 403 US at 391 n 4.
Even assuming that past actions of a different kind could be used to forecast how
many actions would arise under Bivens, the question is how many cases in general would
require the time and resources of federal agents—a number that might extend beyond
only those cases that survived a motion to dismiss. I return to this point in Part IV.C.
51 520 US 681 (1997).
52 Id at 697–98.
53 Id at 701–02 (“[P]etitioner contends that this particular case—as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment might
spawn—may impose an unacceptable burden on the President’s time and energy, and
thereby impair the effective performance of his office.”).
54 See notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
50
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The Court first attempted to calm the fears of flooding by
suggesting that new claims were unlikely to arise, regardless of
its decision. Looking to history, the Court noted that over the
previous two centuries, only three sitting Presidents had faced
suits for private actions.55 The Court concluded, “If the past is
any indicator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation
will ever engulf the Presidency.”56
But the Court went one step farther by suggesting that such
a burden on the executive, even if it existed, would not necessarily establish a violation of the Constitution. As Justice Stevens wrote, “Of greater significance, petitioner errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and the
Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily rise
to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions.”57 The Court reasoned that if the federal courts may burden the executive by reviewing the legality of the President’s
official conduct, then the courts may review the legality of his
unofficial conduct as well.58 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that staying all private actions against the President until he
had left office was unnecessary.59
Yet Justice Breyer wrote separately to suggest that the
Court’s holding should be seen as a threshold, not a bar. In the
opening of his concurrence, Justice Breyer focused on the issue
of future litigation, noting the possibility that the majority could
be “wrong in predicting the future infrequency of private civil litigation against sitting Presidents.”60 He went on to suggest that
the Court had understated the “danger” of future litigation and
55

See Jones, 520 US at 702.
Id. As in Bivens, some slippage seems to exist between the floodgates argument
and the Court’s response to it. After all, the President’s point was that allowing the suit
to go forward would encourage more claims. See Brief for the Petitioner, Clinton v Jones,
No 95-1853, *7–8 (filed Aug 8, 1996) (available on Westlaw at 1996 WL 448096):
56

A personal damages action is bound to be burdensome and disruptive . . . .
There is also no reason to believe that, if it is established that private damages
actions against sitting Presidents may go forward, such suits would be rare. To
the contrary, parties seeking publicity, partisan advantage or a quick settlement will not forbear from using such litigation to advance their objectives.
(emphasis added). As such, history would be an unreliable guide for predicting how
many new claims would follow. I return to this point in Part IV.C.
57 Jones, 520 US at 702.
58 See id at 705.
59 See id at 705–06.
60 Id at 711 (Breyer concurring).
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argued that the Court might have to eventually consider ways of
avoiding “significant interference with the President’s ongoing
discharge of his official responsibilities.”61 Justice Breyer’s separate opinion therefore seemingly leaves the proverbial door
slightly ajar by suggesting that if a future president could show
that he was facing an onslaught of new private claims, the
Court’s position might be different, or indeed might need to be
different.62
Bivens and Jones show that the justices have considered,
and even themselves raised, floodgates arguments in support of
the executive. The underlying concern in both cases is that the
Court’s decision could lead to an onslaught of new claims, which
would significantly hamper the ability of executive actors to perform their official obligations.
As for outcomes, one might be tempted to cast both Bivens
and Jones as cases in which the floodgates argument did not
prevail and thus question how much weight the Court has been
willing to accord such arguments. But as this Section has shown,
a critical factor in both cases seemed to be that the majority did
not believe that a flood was truly coming. Had the Court thought
concerns about floods irrelevant, it would never have bothered to
assure itself on that point in either case. Instead, the Justices
recognized the danger of encumbering law enforcement or the

61 Jones, 520 US at 723–24 (Breyer concurring). Specifically, Justice Breyer suggested that ordinary case-management principles might prove insufficient to handle private civil lawsuits for damages “unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement that district courts schedule proceedings” to avoid interfering with the
President’s ability to perform his official functions. Id (Breyer concurring).
62 Indeed, not long after the decision came down, scholars suggested that the Court
was wrong to be so optimistic, particularly regarding how costly allowing civil litigation
would be for the executive. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River
Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 Tex L Rev 269, 281 n 45
(1999) (noting how President Clinton subsequently argued that the Court “drastically
underestimated” the extent to which civil litigation would burden the President’s time
and how commentators suggested that events after Jones proved the prediction to be
“flatly wrong and even laughable”). Some even questioned whether the Court could appropriately overrule Jones only a few years later. See, for example, Michael C. Dorf, The
Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv L
Rev 4, 76 (1998). Professor Michael Dorf suggested that “the answer depends on whether
one views the course of events as merely idiosyncratic rather than as a harbinger of likely litigation against future Presidents.” Id. Perhaps most telling, the Court later, in
Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 US 367 (2004),
“took back some of the ground it had given away” in Jones, as lower courts “were instructed to better protect internal executive branch deliberations from litigation.” Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 Harv L Rev 29, 35–36 (2004) (citations omitted).

1022

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:1007

president with a vast number of cases, and concluded that no
such danger was present. There is reason to think, particularly
in light of Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Jones, that, if the Court
had perceived a high burden, it would have acted differently.
B.

Encroaching upon the Legislative Branch

In a second category of cases, the Court has considered
floodgates arguments in the context of the relationship between
the federal courts and Congress. In this category, the expressed
concern is not that a flood of cases would burden officials from a
coordinate branch of government, but rather that the potential
flood would show a disregard for legislative intent or arrogation
of power to the judiciary.
With limited exceptions, Article III provides Congress the
last word on the jurisdiction of the federal courts.63 Accordingly,
questions about what claims can come into the courts often reduce to questions of congressional intent.64 Both litigants and
justices frequently invoke images of floodgates to support arguments about why particular classes of claims fall outside the legislative grant of jurisdiction. Flood metaphors serve several distinct roles in this context. Forecasts of floods are sometimes used
as evidence of the existence of a problem—a violation of congressional intent—and sometimes as evidence of the practical extent
of that problem. In a stronger vein, forecasts of floods are also
used to suggest that the Court has usurped the legislative function by expanding federal court jurisdiction on its own.
One of the starkest examples of a floodgates concern in the
legislative-branch context comes from one of the earliest cases to contain a floodgates argument: the 1945 case De Beers

63 See US Const Art III, § 2, cl 2. But for a thoughtful analysis of the limits of Congress’s power to affect the Court’s jurisdiction, see Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv L Rev 17, 20–22 (1981).
64 See, for example, INS v St. Cyr, 533 US 289, 298 (2001) (“For the INS to prevail
it must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent
to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”); American National Red Cross v S.G., 505 US 247, 258
(1992) (“Respondents also claim that language used in congressional charters enacted
closely in time to the 1947 amendment casts doubt on congressional intent thereby to
confer federal jurisdiction over cases involving the Red Cross.”); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v Thompson, 478 US 804, 810 (1986) (“[I]n exploring the outer reaches of
§ 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.”).
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Consolidated Mines, Ltd v United States,65 an antitrust case that
came to the Supreme Court as an interlocutory appeal.66 The
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the lower court’s ruling, but
four Justices dissented on the ground that the Court should not
have considered the appeal in the first place. Specifically, they
argued that the case did not involve the kind of “extraordinary
situation” that Congress intended to be subject to interlocutory
appeal under the Expediting Act of 1903.67 The dissent went on
to say that although one effect of the Act was that some potentially erroneous interlocutory orders would not be reviewable,
Congress made this tradeoff when it enacted the legislation and
the Court “should respect it.”68 It then concluded with its own
forecast: “The decision, if followed, will open the flood gates to
review of interlocutory decrees. It circumvents the policy of Congress to restrict review in these cases to final judgments.”69 The
majority did not respond to the dissent’s floodgates argument,
but its significance is nonetheless easy to perceive. The dissenting Justices in De Beers saw the Court as contravening congressional intent, and the ensuing flood was invoked to prove that
transgression.
But statutory interpretation is not the only context in which
a justice has invoked a floodgates argument to avoid encroaching on what he or she sees as the legislative domain. Similar
rhetoric surfaces even in cases involving constitutional rights. In
Solem v Helm,70 for example, the Court held that the petitioner’s
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when he was sentenced to life without
65

325 US 212 (1945).
Id at 215. The defendants were several foreign corporations who were charged
with engaging in a conspiracy to monopolize commerce in gemstones in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch 647, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1 et
seq, and the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, ch 349, 28 Stat 509 (1894), codified as amended
at 15 USC § 8 et seq. They were challenging a preliminary injunction to restrain them
from selling any property within the United States or withdrawing any property from
the United States until the district court resolved the case. De Beers Consolidated Mines,
325 US at 214–15.
67 De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 223 (Douglas dissenting), citing Expediting Act of 1903, Pub L No 57-82, ch 544, 32 Stat 823, codified as amended at 15 USC
§ 29. The purpose of the Expediting Act was to allow the Attorney General to seek “expeditious treatment” of cases brought under the Sherman Act that were deemed to be of
general public importance. Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion Picture
Industry, 21 Yale J Reg 317, 344 n 145 (2004).
68 De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 225 (Douglas dissenting).
69 Id (Douglas dissenting).
70 463 US 277 (1983).
66
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parole after committing a series of nonviolent crimes.71 Chief
Justice Burger dissented, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist,
and O’Connor, arguing that, in reaching its decision, the Court
had given itself the power to review sentences for excessiveness—something that, at that point,72 Congress had not intended.73 As Chief Justice Burger wrote, Congress had pondered for
decades the concept of appellate review of sentences and had
hesitated to act,74 meaning that the Court’s own decision constituted “judicial usurpation with a vengeance.”75
The dissent’s floodgates reasoning echoed that of the dissent
in De Beers in some ways but differed in others. The Chief Justice wrote that the “real risk” of the decision was that it would
result in a “flood” of new cases, all requiring difficult decisions
by the courts.76 This buttressed his conclusion that Congress
could not have intended such a result,77 just as Justice Douglas’s
floodgates argument had done in De Beers.78 But in Solem the
floodgates argument also took on a weight of its own. The invocation of a flood was used not simply to show that the Court had
made an error but also to convey the cost of that error. The
Court had contravened congressional intent, and its doing so
would impact a significant number of cases.79

71

Id at 303.
Just one year after Solem was decided, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, which provided for appellate review. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq and 28 USC
§ 991 et seq. See also Kate Stith and José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing
Guidelines in the Federal Courts 2 (Chicago 1998) (describing one of the “hallmarks” of
the Sentencing Reform Act as providing “for the first time . . . for appellate review of
sentences”).
73 Solem, 463 US at 314–15 (Burger dissenting).
74 Id at 315 (Burger dissenting).
75 Id (Burger dissenting).
76 Id (Burger dissenting). See also Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death:
The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 Mich
L Rev 1145, 1182–86 (2009) (describing the administrative concerns attendant with the
Court’s proportionality jurisprudence).
77 Solem, 463 US at 314–15 (Burger dissenting).
78 See De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 225 (Douglas dissenting) (“Certainly
Congress knew that some interlocutory orders might be erroneous when it chose to make
them non-reviewable.”). See also notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
79 Solem, 463 US at 314–15 (Burger dissenting). This latter point suggests that the
Chief Justice was also motivated by the kind of court-centered floodgates concerns described in Part III. Indeed, this is a good example of the fact that the categories described here are not mutually exclusive; some floodgates arguments encompass more
than one type of concern (regarding more than one governmental institution).
72
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As in Bivens and Jones,80 the Solem majority responded to
the floodgates argument by refuting the suggestion that it had
done anything to open the floodgates. Writing for the majority,
Justice Powell argued that “[c]ontrary to the dissent’s suggestions, we do not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of sentences.”81 A few lines farther down in the
opinion, he went out of his way to show that the Court had not
overextended itself vis-à-vis Congress, writing, “In view of the
substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not
constitutionally disproportionate.”82 By arguing that its decision
was narrow, the majority was attempting to minimize the extent
to which it was contravening (or appearing to contravene83) legislative intent. And although the Court did not specifically refer
to floodgates, it implied that its limited holding would not invite
a slew of new claims.
Since the dissents in De Beers and Solem first employed
them, floodgates arguments in the judicial-legislative context
have taken on increased prominence. In the cases that follow,
the prime discussion of floodgates appears in majority opinions,
with the Court offering assurances that its decision will not result in new litigation. Put another way, these cases show the
Court offering assurances on its own that it is not disregarding
congressional intent.
In Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,84 for
example, a unanimous85 Court held that the Medicare Act86 did
not bar judicial review of regulations promulgated under Part B
80 See Bivens, 403 US at 391 n 4 (rejecting the dissent’s concern that an “avalanche” of new cases would follow); Jones, 520 US at 702 (“[I]t seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency.”).
81 Solem, 463 US at 290 n 16 (citation omitted).
82 Id (emphasis added).
83 Consider Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex L Rev 959,
1012 (2008) (assessing the significance of the appearance of various constitutional
decisions).
84 476 US 667 (1986).
85 Id at 668.
86 Through the Medicare Act, Congress created a scheme for the judicial review of
certain Medicare claims and not others, such as those under general federal question
jurisdiction. See Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 102(a), Pub L No 89-97, 79 Stat
286, 330, 331, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 1395ff(B)(1), 1395ii; 42 USC § 405(g).
See also Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 Tex L Rev 339, 356–57 (2005) (describing Michigan Academy of
Family Physicians and the Medicare Act more generally).
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of the Medicare program,87 going out of its way to note that “[w]e
do not believe that our decision will open the floodgates to millions of Part B Medicare claims.”88 The basis for this statement
was the Court’s own experience: “We observed no flood of litigation in the first 20 years of operation of Part B of the Medicare
program, and we seriously doubt that we will be inundated in
the future.”89 But the significance of the statement was that it
provided assurance that the Court was not contravening the intention of Congress in passing the Medicare Act.
The Court has continued to consider these concerns—most
recently in the 2011 case Skinner v Switzer.90 In Skinner, a convicted state prisoner sought access to crime-scene evidence for
the purposes of DNA testing.91 The question presented was
whether he could raise the claim in federal court in a civil rights
action under 42 USC § 1983, as opposed to the recognized route
of filing a petition for habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254.92 The
respondent argued that recognizing a claim of this kind under
§ 1983 would result in a “vast expansion” of federal jurisdiction.93 The majority found these fears to be “unwarranted.”94 As
part of its reasoning, the Court noted that “[i]n the Circuits that
currently allow § 1983 claims for DNA testing . . . no evidence
tendered by Switzer shows any litigation flood or even rainfall.”95 The Court went on to give additional reasons why its
holding would not result in a flood, including that Congress had

87

Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US at 669.
Id at 680–81 n 11.
89 Id. The Court went on to say that “as one commentator pointed out, ‘permitting
review only [of] . . . a particular statutory or administrative standard . . . would not result in a costly flood of litigation, because the validity of a standard can be readily established, at times even in a single case.’” Id (alterations in original), quoting Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit Disbursement: Reasserting
Separation of Powers, 97 Harv L Rev 778, 792 (1984).
90 131 S Ct 1289 (2011).
91 Id at 1293.
92 Id. See also Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas after Pinholster, 53 BC L Rev 953,
1004–05 (2012).
93 Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299.
94 Id.
95 Id. Justice Ginsburg relied on this same language in Connick v Thompson, 131 S
Ct 1350 (2011), from the same term. Id at 1382–83 n 17 (Ginsburg dissenting) (“The deliberate indifference jury instruction in this case was based on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Walker v. New York . . . . There has been no ‘litigation flood or even rainfall,’ Skinner v. Switzer, in that Circuit in Walker’s wake.”) (citations omitted), citing Walker v
New York, 974 F2d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir 1992), and quoting Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299.
88

2013]

Judging the Flood of Litigation

1027

specifically designed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 199596
(PLRA) to help control the influx of prisoner suits into the federal courts.97 In short, the majority tried to make plain that its decision would not result in a deluge of new claims and ultimately
that it was not unduly expanding its own authority vis-à-vis
Congress.98
These cases and others99 demonstrate the Court’s use of
floodgates arguments to bolster its determinations about substantive law. And as with the executive-centered cases described
in Part I.A, the Court does so in the interests of a coordinate
branch of government—here, the legislature. But important differences exist between the cases arising in the context of judicialexecutive interactions and those arising in judicial-legislative
ones. The former are primarily concerned with the direct effects
of a flood on executive actors and the encumbrances the flood
would create. In the latter cases, the Court does not fear that an
influx of filings would place a burden on the legislative branch.
Rather, the concern in these cases is that a possible deluge of
new claims would demonstrate that the Court had disregarded
congressional intent or even that the Court had usurped the legislative function altogether.

96 Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Title VIII
§§ 801–10, Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321, 1321-066 to -077, codified in relevant part,
as amended, at 18 USC § 3626.
97 See Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299.
98 For a similar sentiment, see Smith v Wade, 461 US 30, 91 (1983) (Rehnquist dissenting) (“In a time when the courts are flooded with suits that do not raise colorable
claims . . . it is regrettable that the Court should take upon itself, in apparent disregard
for the likely intent of the 42d Congress, the legislative task of encouraging yet more
litigation.”).
99 In a slightly separate vein, the Court has decided cases in which it has referred
to Congress’s attempts to address a flood of cases through legislation. See, for example,
Jones v Bock, 549 US 199, 203 (2007):

Our legal system [ ] remains committed to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of
illegal conduct by their custodians are fairly handled according to law. The
challenge lies in ensuring that the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not
submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit.
Congress addressed that challenge in the PLRA.
(citation omitted); Woodford v Ngo, 548 US 81, 91–92 n 2 (2006):
As for the suggestion that the PLRA might be meant to require proper exhaustion of nonconstitutional claims but not constitutional claims, we fail to see
how such a carve-out would serve Congress’ purpose of addressing a flood of
prisoner litigation in the federal courts when the overwhelming majority of
prisoner civil rights and prison condition suits are based on the Constitution.
(citation omitted).
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As in the judicial-executive context, none of the decisions
here rest exclusively or unambiguously on floodgates arguments.
Such arguments are more often employed as accusations by dissenters than they are embraced by majorities. But the evolution
from De Beers through cases such as Skinner shows a Court that
increasingly believes such arguments must at the very least be
answered, and thus have relevance in substantive decision
making.
II. INTERSYSTEMIC CONCERNS
The previous Part demonstrated that the justices have used
floodgates arguments to orient the Court with respect to coordinate branches of government, ensuring that it does not unduly
burden the executive or disregard congressional intent. This
Part discusses how the Court has also considered floodgates arguments in the context of its relationship to state courts. Specifically, justices have raised or responded to two types of such
floodgates concerns: first, about flooding the federal courts with
claims that belong in state courts, and second, flooding the state
courts with claims or obligations that would significantly burden
them.
Both sets of concerns can be understood as part of a larger
intersystemic concern about the balance between federal and
state courts.100 As these cases demonstrate, the justices have
been concerned with how a high volume of litigation and attendant obligations can affect or even upset that balance.
A.

Taking Too Many Cases That Belong in State Courts

The justices have considered in some cases whether a particular decision will lead to a flood of new claims into federal
court—claims that would otherwise fall to state courts. Many issues are bound up in these cases, but a consistent theme is that
some justices do not want to upset the balance between the two
court systems by, in effect, taking too many cases that they believe belong in state court.
A prime example of this phenomenon can be found in United
States v Maze,101 a 1974 case involving the federal mail fraud

100 See Gluck, 120 Yale L J at 1906 (cited in note 22) (using the term “intersystemic”
to describe the relationship between the federal and state court systems).
101 414 US 395 (1974).
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statute.102 A majority of the Court concluded that the defendant’s
actions—which included stealing a credit card but not directly
using the mails103—fell outside the definition of the statute.104
Chief Justice Burger dissented, suggesting that the majority’s
decision was influenced by its “seeming desire not to flood the
federal courts with a multitude of prosecutions for relatively minor acts of credit card misrepresentation considered as more appropriately the business of the States.”105 In other words, the
majority had, assuming Chief Justice Burger’s account, interpreted federal law narrowly so as to keep its own dockets from
being inflated and to not encroach upon “the business of the
States.” Although this is in part a concern about overcrowding
the federal courts, it is also undoubtedly one about maintaining
the “appropriate[ ]” balance of federal-state power.106
A more recent example can be seen in Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA v Allstate Insurance Co.107 The question in Shady Grove was whether the petitioners’ suit could proceed as a class action—a question that
turned on whether New York’s law prohibiting a class action
seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages conflicted
with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.108 A majority of the Court held that the New York law conflicted with Rule
23 and that Rule 23 must govern.109 Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, dissented, arguing that the
rules could be reconciled but also that the decision would create
intersystemic problems.110 Specifically, the dissent predicted
that, as a result of the decision, federal courts would become a
“mecca” for “class actions seeking state-created penalties for
claims arising under state law—claims that would be barred
from class treatment in the State’s own courts.”111 Justice
102

Id at 396, citing 18 USC § 1341.
Specifically, Thomas Maze had stolen his roommate’s credit card and used it in
multiple states at various purveyors, who ultimately mailed receipts to the bank attached to the credit card. See Maze, 414 US at 396.
104 See id at 404–05.
105 See id at 407 (Burger dissenting).
106 Id (Burger dissenting).
107 130 S Ct 1431 (2010).
108 See id at 1436, citing FRCP 23.
109 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 130 S Ct at 1448.
110 See id at 1460 (Ginsburg dissenting).
111 Id at 1473 (Ginsburg dissenting). There was also a legislative intent element to
this argument—Justice Ginsburg noted that surely Congress did not mean to cause this
outcome when creating the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Pub L No 109-2, 119 Stat
103
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Ginsburg then argued that her own proposed approach would
not result in an improper shuffling of cases from state to federal
court: “There is no risk that individual plaintiffs seeking statutory penalties will flood federal courts with state-law claims that
could be managed more efficiently on a class basis; the diversity
statute’s amount-in-controversy requirement ensures that small
state-law disputes remain in state court.”112
Shady Grove raises a multitude of questions about interpreting state law and Federal Rules,113 about the nature of the
Rules Enabling Act,114 and about federalism generally.115 But in
the midst of this considerable decision, the Justices also took
care to address the balance of cases between the state and federal courts. In particular, Justice Ginsburg went out of her way
to note that, under her view of how the case should be decided,
the federal courts would not be “flood[ed]”116 with cases that truly belonged in state court, emphasizing the view that an onslaught of such cases coming into federal court would be
problematic.
But perhaps the best example of the Court being concerned
with intersystemic issues can be seen in the 2005 case Grable &
Sons Metal Products, Inc v Darue Engineering & Manufacturing.117 In Grable, the Court again tried to define the boundaries
of the federal question jurisdiction (its earlier attempt in Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v Thompson118 having left something
to be desired119). The specific question at hand was whether a
state-law quiet-title action against a federal tax sale purchaser
4, codified in various sections of Title 28. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 130 S
Ct at 1473 (Ginsburg dissenting).
112 Id at 1472–73 n 14 (Ginsburg dissenting).
113 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 Nw U L Rev 1, 50–53 (2012).
114 Pub L No 73-415, ch 651, 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified as amended at 28 USC
§ 2072. See also Stephen B. Burbank and Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the
Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U Pa L Rev 17, 25–53 (2010).
115 See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame L Rev 1131, 1137–43 (2011).
116 Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 130 S Ct at 1472–73 n 14 (Ginsburg
dissenting).
117 545 US 308 (2005).
118 478 US 804 (1986).
119 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented
from the majority’s holding in Merrell Dow, arguing that the Court’s new test for federal
question jurisdiction was “infinitely malleable.” Id at 821–23 n 1 (Brennan dissenting).
Court scholars were even stronger in their criticism. See, for example, Martin Redish,
Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 99–102 (Michie 2d ed
1990).
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could be removed from state to federal court, in light of the fact
that an essential element of the claim was that the previous
owner had not received adequate notice of the sale from the Internal Revenue Service.120 A unanimous Court concluded that
the case could be brought in federal court, and noted that expanding federal question jurisdiction in this way “would not distort any division of labor between the state and federal
courts.”121 Indeed, the Court’s holding was clearly influenced by
the fact that its decision would not greatly upset the state-court
balance. As Justice Souter wrote for the majority:
Because arising-under jurisdiction to hear a state-law claim
always raises the possibility of upsetting the state-federal
line drawn (or at least assumed) by Congress, the presence
of a disputed federal issue and the ostensible importance of
a federal forum are never necessarily dispositive; there
must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in
exercising federal jurisdiction.122
The Court then determined that allowing the particular case at
hand would not be problematic, because it would not result in a
flood of cases: “[B]ecause it will be the rare state title case that
raises a contested matter of federal law, federal jurisdiction to
resolve genuine disagreement over federal tax title provisions
will portend only a microscopic effect on the federal-state division of labor.”123 (This finding was in marked contrast to what
would have happened, the Court said, if it had allowed in the
kind of claim at issue in Merrell Dow—a “tremendous number of
cases” would have come from state to federal court.124) Returning
to the floodgates theme once more, the Court concluded, “jurisdiction over actions like Grable’s would not materially affect, or
threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation.”125
In both Maze and Shady Grove, one can see members of the
Court considering the effects of diverting cases into federal
courts that, to their minds, are truly the business of state
120

Grable & Sons Metal Products, 545 US at 310–11.
Id at 310.
122 Id at 314. It is worth noting that in addition to being concerned about the division of labor between the federal and state court systems, the Court was also concerned
about being faithful to Congress’s view of where this division should lie. As noted earlier,
the categories of floodgates cases are not meant to be exclusive of each other—some cases
will of course raise multiple kinds of floodgates concerns. See note 79.
123 Grable & Sons Metal Products, 545 US at 315.
124 Id at 318.
125 Id at 319.
121
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courts.126 In Grable, the entirety of the Court is concerned with
the division of labor between the state and federal courts, and
how that division is affected ultimately dictates the outcome of
the case. Most importantly, in all of these cases, the expressed
concern of the justices is not simply one about how an increased
caseload would affect the federal judiciary, but about the balance between the federal and state courts more broadly.
B.

Creating Too Many Cases or Obligations for State Courts

Beyond worrying about shifting cases from state to federal
court, the justices have also worried about the inverse problem:127 creating too many cases—and obligations more generally—for state courts.128 Examples of this concern can be found in
the line of cases on the termination of parental rights—obliquely
in the 1981 case of Lassiter v Department of Social Services of
Durham County, North Carolina129 and then overtly in the 1996
case of M.L.B. v S.L.J.130
126 Although not expressed in terms of floodgates, another recent example of this
general sentiment can be found in Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S Ct 2592
(2010). As Justice Breyer argued,

[T]he approach the plurality would take today threatens to open the federal court doors to constitutional review of many, perhaps large numbers of,
state-law cases in an area of law familiar to state, but not federal, judges. And
the failure of that approach to set forth procedural limitations or canons of deference would create the distinct possibility that federal judges would play a
major role in the shaping of a matter of significant state interest—state property law.
Id at 2619 (Breyer concurring).
127 The claim is that this category is the inverse of the previous one insofar as the
previous category included concerns about taking too many cases from state courts while
this category includes concerns about imposing too many cases or obligations on state
courts. I recognize that the two are not perfectly opposite from the standpoint of the federal courts, though. In the previous category, the federal courts were taking cases that
would otherwise go to the state courts; in this category, the federal courts’ caseload is not
necessarily impacted.
128 In a related vein, the Court has considered concerns that a particular holding
would lead to a flood of cases that would create mutually exclusive obligations for the
states. See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith,
494 US 872, 916 (1990) (Blackmun dissenting):
The State fears that, if it grants an exemption for religious peyote use, a flood
of other claims to religious exemptions will follow. It would then be placed in a
dilemma, it says, between allowing a patchwork of exemptions that would hinder its law enforcement efforts, and risking a violation of the Establishment
Clause by arbitrarily limiting its religious exemptions.
129
130

452 US 18 (1981).
519 US 102 (1996).
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In Lassiter, the Court confronted the question of whether
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in all parental
status–termination proceedings.131 A majority of the Court decided against recognizing a categorical right, and instead adopted a case-by-case approach.132 Although the Court’s opinion did
not state that finding the right to counsel in all parental status–
termination cases would lead to an increase in caseload, the dissenting Justices argued that this fear motivated the Court’s decision making. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, wrote that requiring appointment of counsel in
these cases “will not open the ‘floodgates’ that, I suspect, the
Court fears.”133 The dissent continued: “On the contrary, we cannot constitutionally afford the closure that the result in this sad
case imposes upon us all.”134 While the dissenting Justices’ language is not entirely precise, it suggests that they thought the
majority was improperly motivated by a fear of additional due
process cases coming into court135—both federal and state136—as
well as imposing a burden on the states by requiring them to
supply counsel in more cases.137
In M.L.B., several of the Justices raised similar intersystemic concerns about the burdens that the Court would be imposing upon the states, this time more directly. In M.L.B. a
131

Lassiter, 452 US at 24.
See id at 32–33.
133 Id at 58–59 (Blackmun dissenting).
134 Id at 59 (Blackmun dissenting). Notably, the dissent began by arguing that a
contrary decision would not open the floodgates, but then concluded with a different sentiment: that the price of closing the gates would be too costly. Yet the precise cost the
Justices were concerned with is unclear; it is ambiguous whether they were taking the
position that the Court should not consider a potential increase in litigation in this realm
full stop or whether the particular issues raised in this case justified the number of cases
that might flow from it.
135 See Stephen Loffredo and Don Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg: The Case for a
Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 Touro L Rev 273, 311 (2009):
132

Lassiter is most intelligible through the lens of underenforcement . . . as a prudential determination to cabin the so-called “due process revolution”—and calm
the institutional, federalism, and separation-of-powers concerns it carried in its
wake—by drawing a doctrinally arbitrary line to close the “floodgates” the
Court apparently feared.
136 Lassiter itself had come from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Lassiter, 452
US at 24.
137 See Note, Access to Justice—Civil Right to Counsel—California Establishes Pilot
Programs to Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties—Act of Oct. 11, 2009, ch.
457 (Codified in Scattered Sections of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code and Cal. Gov’t Code), 123
Harv L Rev 1532, 1536 (2010).
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mother appealed a decree terminating her parental rights, but
her appeal was dismissed because she could not afford the fee to
prepare the record below as Mississippi law required.138 The majority held that it was unconstitutional for Mississippi to condition the right to appeal on ability to pay, invoking both due process and equal protection.139 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia and in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that by creating a constitutional right to a free transcript in
a civil case (as opposed to in criminal cases, where the right had
already been established),140 the Court was inviting a flood of
new cases.141 As Justice Thomas wrote, “The inevitable consequence will be greater demands on the States to provide free assistance to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases involving interests that cannot, based on the test established by
the majority, be distinguished from the admittedly important interest at issue here.”142 The Justice went on to emphasize just
what a burden the decision would create for state courts, citing
the tens of thousands of civil actions that Mississippi faced each
year.143
The majority addressed these arguments directly, noting
that “[r]espondents and the dissenters urge that we will open
floodgates” if the right were extended to include free transcripts in noncriminal cases.144 The Court’s response was that
parental-termination cases were sufficiently sui generis so as to avoid

138

M.L.B., 519 US at 106.
See id at 107. See also Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U Pa L Rev 2119, 2135 (2000) (describing how requiring a subsidy for this
“and then only for this” class of litigant “required the Court to thread a complex path in
light of contemporary equal protection and due process law”).
140 See Mayer v City of Chicago, 404 US 189, 193–94 (1971) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause requires providing an indigent criminal defendant appealing his conviction with an adequate record even in cases involving a minor offense); Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 19 (1956) (plurality) (holding that a state must provide an indigent
criminal defendant appealing his conviction with a trial transcript or its equivalent).
141 M.L.B., 519 US at 129–30 (Thomas dissenting).
142 Id at 130 (Thomas dissenting).
143 Id at 143 n 8 (Thomas dissenting). Specifically, Justice Thomas argued that
“Mississippi will no doubt find little solace in the fact that, as the majority notes, of
63,765 civil actions filed in Mississippi Chancery Court in 1995, 194 were parental termination cases . . . [since] ‘39,475 were domestic relations cases,’ ‘1027 involved custody
or visitation, and 6080 were paternity cases.’” Id, quoting Brief for Respondents, M.L.B.
v S.L.J., No 95-853, *28 (filed June 28, 1996) (available on Westlaw at 1996 WL 365897).
144 M.L.B., 519 US at 127 (majority).
139
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creating a flood.145 Because the majority saw parental-termination
cases as a distinct set, it was not concerned that a flood of requests would come to state court for free transcripts or that the
states would now be obligated to pay for free transcripts in other
kinds of cases. It simply did not forecast a flood of any kind.
Together, Lassiter and M.L.B. show the justices to be concerned about the effects their decisions will have on the volume
of litigation—litigation that will largely end up in state
court146—and the creation of related obligations, such as free
transcripts.147 As in the interbranch context, the immediate concern is not over flooding the federal courts with additional cases.
Rather, these cases, along with Maze, Shady Grove, and Grable,
show the Court considering floodgates arguments while engaging more generally with the question of how their decisions will
affect the balance between the federal and state court systems.
III. COURT-CENTERED CONCERNS
The floodgates arguments discussed thus far can be cast as
primarily outward looking; that is, the Supreme Court has considered what a deluge of claims would mean for another
145 Id 127–28. As the majority wrote, “[W]e have repeatedly noticed what sets parental status termination decrees apart from mine run civil actions, even from other domestic relations matters such as divorce, paternity, and child custody. To recapitulate, termination decrees ‘wor[k] a unique kind of deprivation.’” Id (second alteration in original
and citation omitted), quoting Lassiter, 452 US at 27.
146 For another example of a concern over increasing filings in the state courts, see
Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 550–51 (2000) (O’Connor dissenting):

[P]erhaps the most significant impact of the Court’s decision will be a practical
one—its unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under current federal and
state determinate-sentencing schemes. . . . Thus, with respect to past sentences
handed down by judges under determinate-sentencing schemes, the Court’s decision threatens to unleash a flood of petitions by convicted defendants seeking
to invalidate their sentences in whole or in part on the authority of the Court’s
decision today. Statistics compiled by the United States Sentencing Commission reveal that almost a half-million cases have been sentenced under the
Sentencing Guidelines since 1989. Federal cases constitute only the tip of the
iceberg. . . . Because many States, like New Jersey, have determinatesentencing schemes, the number of individual sentences drawn into question
by the Court’s decision could be colossal.
147 It is worth noting that parts of the floodgates arguments in Lassiter and M.L.B.
have a slippery slope quality to them—that is, if the Court recognizes the right to counsel or a free transcript in this case, it will necessarily have to do so in the next set of cases down the line. See note 13. That said, because the justices are also clearly concerned
with the number of cases and attendant obligations that the state courts will be forced to
handle as a result of their decisions, these cases can be understood as traditional floodgates cases as well.
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institution, or its dynamic with that institution—be it the executive branch, the legislative branch, or state courts. But there is a
final set of floodgates arguments that are inward looking,
through which the justices consider guarding the floodgates to
protect the federal judiciary itself.
At the most basic level, the Court in these cases considers
the possibility of a flood because it is concerned that a slew of
additional cases would lead to an increased workload for the
federal courts. But not all floods are alike, and the Court has reacted to them based not only on their size, but also on the types
of claims they are likely to contain. Specifically, the justices
sometimes argue that a particular decision would be problematic
because it would unleash a large number of frivolous cases,
making it more difficult to give time to, and even to discern, the
meritorious claims the courts must review. In other cases, the
justices make no mention of potential frivolity, focusing instead
on the sheer number of cases that could come into federal court.
Context is crucial for deciphering the Court’s arguments,
and timing is part of that context. Between 1950 and 1978, the
annual filings per active judgeship in the federal courts of appeals nearly doubled—from 73 to 137.148 Although figures for the
district judges improved as their ranks more than doubled during this period, they still faced an average of 343 filings per year
at the end of that time.149 As a result, judges and scholars began
to refer to the “crisis in volume” that the federal judiciary
faced.150 Since that time, the caseloads have only continued to
expand.151 It is thus unsurprising that, particularly beginning in
148 See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
Final Report 14 (Dec 18, 1998), online at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/final
/appstruc.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2013).
149 Id.
150 See Huang, 124 Harv L Rev at 1112 (cited in note 9). See also Levy, 61 Duke L J
at 321 n 21 (cited in note 35).
151 As of the 12-month period ending March 31, 2013, the average number of filings
per active judgeship in the federal courts of appeals was 338 (which is the number of filings excluding the Federal Circuit—56,453—divided by the number of active judgeships
excluding the Federal Circuit—167). See U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile *1 (Administrative Office of the US Courts Mar, 2013), online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagement
Statistics/2013/appeals-fcms-profiles-march-2013.pdf&page=1 (visited Sept 10, 2013).
The annual filing per active judge in the federal district courts during the same time
period was 560. See United States District Courts—National Judicial Caseload Profile *1
(Administrative
Office
of
the
US
Courts
Mar,
2013)
online
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagement
Statistics/2013/district-fcms-profiles-march-2013.pdf&page=1 (visited Sept 10, 2013).
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the 1970s, justices began to raise floodgates concerns on their
own152 and their colleagues’ behalf.
This Part explores the various court-centered floodgates arguments that the Court has confronted, beginning with those focused on frivolous claims before turning to those based on claims
more generally. Though the particulars vary, the theme remains
the same: the Court has consistently considered the possibility
that a particular decision will result in a flood of new claims into
the federal courts, and has even taken that possibility into account in its substantive analysis.
A.

Burdening the Courts with Frivolous Claims

The justices have often expressed the concern that a given
holding will unleash a flood of new claims—particularly frivolous claims.153 As one might expect, this kind of court-centered
argument appears with a relatively high frequency in lines of
cases that have consistently been perceived as containing a high
percentage of unmeritorious claims: Bivens,154 habeas,155 and

152 It is worth remembering that before Congress enacted legislation in 1988 to make
the Court’s jurisdiction almost entirely discretionary, the Court’s own docket was viewed
as “unmanageable.” See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U Penn L Rev 1, 13 (2011). Indeed, in 1972, Chief Justice Burger created a commission, known as the Freund Study Group, specifically to examine the
demanding workload of the Supreme Court and ways to reduce the burden on the Court.
See Judith A. McKenna, Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals: Report to the United States Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United
States 76 (1993).
153 Although the Court discusses floodgates in the context of frivolous cases and in
the context of claims more generally, just which concern is animating the argument in a
given opinion is not always clear. As with the rest of the discussion, I rely primarily on
the text of the opinions themselves to determine the particular concern. But as with the
preceding categories, the categories surveyed in this Part are not impermeable.
154 See, for example, James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made
Law in Constitutional Litigation, 114 Penn St L Rev 1387, 1407 (2010) (noting the “widely held view that frivolous Bivens claims . . . have multiplied over the past generation to
a degree that threatens to overwhelm the federal judiciary”). See also Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 Stan L Rev 809, 846 (2010) (noting that there are “those in the
judiciary who see Bivens claims as almost universally frivolous” but also providing data
that indicates that Bivens claims have enjoyed “greater success than has been assumed
to date”).
155 Judges and justices have consistently viewed habeas filings as being filled with a
high percentage of frivolous cases. Justice Jackson wrote in Brown v Allen, 344 US 443
(1953), that “[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application [for habeas corpus] to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.” Id at 537 (Jackson concurring). Nearly
twenty years later, Judge Henry Friendly commented on Justice Jackson’s sentiment,
writing, “The thought may be distasteful but no judge can honestly deny it is real.”

1038

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:1007

prisoner cases.156 The discussion here focuses on these lines of
cases157 not only because they have been prominent sources of
floodgates arguments, but also because these three areas of substantive law, in turn, illustrate three different ways in which
court-centered floodgates concerns can impact legal decision
making: in a policy-making context, in statutory interpretation,
and in consideration of constitutional claims.
1. Bivens cases.
The Bivens line of cases provides the starkest examples of
the justices considering floodgates reasoning in their substantive analysis. This makes sense on an intuitive level as Bivens is
generally understood to allow for “judicial policymaking”158—
thereby giving the justices greater latitude in their own decision
making. What is surprising, though, is the extent to which the
Court as a whole has pivoted on whether concerns about workload can be taken into account when deciding whether to recognize a private right of action and remedy. Because of this
marked judicial back-and-forth, and because the justices themselves specifically discuss “the ‘floodgates’ argument” in the context of this line of cases,159 Bivens and its progeny merit particular attention.

Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U Chi L Rev 142, 149 (1970).
156 The number of frivolous filings from prisoners—particularly pro se—was perceived to be such a problem that Congress passed the PLRA. In the words of the Supreme Court, “Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [the exhaustion provision of the PLRA]
to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter v Nussle, 534
US 516, 524 (2002). Still, Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
wrote that the challenge for courts, even after the passage of the PLRA, is “to avoid letting the large number of frivolous complaints and appeals impair their conscientious
consideration of the few meritorious cases that are filed.” Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 Brooklyn L Rev 519, 526–27 (1996).
157 Floodgates arguments, of course, have existed outside of these three lines of cases. See, for example, Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 238 (1997) (“If we were to sanction
this use of Rule 60(b)(5), respondents argue, we would encourage litigants to burden the
federal courts with a deluge of Rule 60(b)(5) motions premised on nothing more than the
claim that various judges or Justices have stated that the law has changed.”); Stack v
Boyle, 342 US 1, 11–13 (1951) (Jackson concurring) (describing the need for an approach
to reviewing bail orders that “would not open the floodgates to a multitude of trivial disputes abusive of the motion procedure”). These three lines of cases are simply the most
prominent among the cases surveyed.
158 See George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit”—The Bivens
Impasse, 82 S Cal L Rev 841, 883 (2009).
159 Wilkie, 551 US at 577 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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As noted in Part I.A, the specific floodgates argument raised
in Bivens was that recognizing the cause of action would result
in suits that would in turn hamper the ability of executive officials to perform their jobs. Yet other opinions in the case revealed a deep concern for the welfare of the federal judiciary itself. In his dissent, Justice Black wrote that the courts160 by that
time were “choked with lawsuits” and that even the Supreme
Court’s own docket had reached “an unprecedented volume.”161
As a result of the rise in caseload, Justice Black argued that the
system was not functioning as it should: “Many criminal defendants do not receive speedy trials and neither society nor the accused are assured of justice when inordinate delays occur. Citizens must wait years to litigate their private civil suits.”162 From
his perspective, a “growing number” of the cases coming to the
federal courts were “frivolous,” and given the existing demands
on the courts, he thought that judges had better things to do
with their time than wade through such claims.163
Justice Harlan responded in his concurrence with what
would become the paradigmatic denouncement of court-centered
floodgates arguments. While acknowledging the “increasingly
scarce” resources of the judiciary, he also argued that the courts’
strained resources should not preclude recognition of a cause of
action:
[W]hen we automatically close the courthouse door solely on
this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the
comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests. And current limitations upon the effective functioning
of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should
not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of
otherwise sound constitutional principles.164
Members of the Court have repeatedly invoked this rejection of
workload-related floodgates arguments as the Court has continued to confront whether to create new private rights of action
under Bivens.
160 Justice Black here refers to both the “courts of the United States” and “those of
the States” when expressing his concerns. Bivens, 403 US at 428 (Black dissenting).
161 Id (Black dissenting). Again, it is important to recall that the decision in Bivens
occurred well before the Supreme Court’s docket became almost entirely discretionary.
See note 152.
162 Bivens, 403 US at 428–29 (Black dissenting).
163 Id (Black dissenting).
164 Id at 411 (Harlan concurring).
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Eight years later in Davis v Passman,165 the Court considered whether an implied cause of action and damages remedy
could be read into the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process.166
The court of appeals had declined to recognize a new private
right of action—a decision based in part on its concern that doing so would “delug[e] federal courts with claims.”167 The Supreme Court reversed the decision and went out of its way to
state that “[w]e do not perceive the potential for such a deluge.”168 After rejecting the notion that a flood of claims would
likely follow its decision, however, the Court rejected the very
invocation of floodgates reasoning. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated, “[P]erhaps the most fundamental answer to
the concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals is that provided
by Mr. Justice Harlan concurring in Bivens.”169 He then repeated
Justice Harlan’s statement that the Court should not “automatically close the courthouse door solely” on the basis of how decisions affect judicial resources.170
Despite the Court’s resounding rejection of the floodgates
argument in Passman, the Justices apparently found the same
argument deeply influential in a more recent case—a move consistent with the Court’s seeming desire to limit Bivens claims
generally.171 In Wilkie, the Court declined to recognize a Bivens
action for a person who claimed that he was harassed and intimidated by officials of the Bureau of Land Management who were
trying to gain an easement across his private property in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.172 Writing for
the majority, Justice Souter engaged in a balancing analysis173
165

442 US 228 (1979).
Id at 230. The case arose when Shirley Davis, a former employee of Louisiana
Congressman Otto Passman, tried to bring a civil suit against Passman for sexual harassment. Davis claimed that she had an implied cause of action in the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process. Id at 230–31.
167 Davis v Passman, 571 F2d 793, 800 (5th Cir 1978).
168 Passman, 442 US at 248. By way of support, the Court noted, inter alia, that a
damages remedy was already available to redress certain injuries arising under color of
state law under 42 USC § 1983. Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Reinert, 62 Stan L Rev at 824 (cited in note 154) (noting the “Supreme
Court’s refusal to extend Bivens liability to new constitutional claims or new defendants
since 1980”).
172 Wilkie, 551 US at 541.
173 Specifically, the Court said that its task was to “weigh[ ] reasons for and against
the creation of a new cause of action.” Id at 554. This inquiry is also known as “Bivens
step two.” Id, citing Bush v Lucas, 462 US 367, 378 (1983). The Court in Wilkie reached
166
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and concluded that defining a “workable” cause of action in the
case at hand was simply too difficult.174 Any kind of general
standard that the Court could articulate, the majority argued,
would invite a flood of new claims.175 To be clear, the majority’s
argument was not that the government’s alleged behavior could
not support a Bivens claim—indeed, Justice Souter wrote that
“[t]he point here is not to deny that Government employees
sometimes overreach, for of course they do, and they may have
done so here”176—but that any attempt to separate the wheat
from the chaff would lead to too much work for the courts themselves. As the majority concluded, “A judicial standard to identify illegitimate pressure going beyond legitimately hard bargaining would be endlessly knotty to work out, and . . . would invite
an onslaught of Bivens actions.”177 It is worth noting that the
majority went out of its way to claim that its decision was influenced by how difficult it was to create a limiting principle for future cases, not by how many cases would follow.178 But this
statement is inconsistent with the majority’s express concern
over inviting “an onslaught of Bivens actions”179 and indeed, the
dissent clearly thought it was the possibility of increased litigation that was motivating the majority’s decision.180
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens,
squarely rejected the majority’s reliance on floodgates concerns.
Alleging that the Court’s primary concern was with the “consequences” of “open[ing] the floodgates to a host of unworthy
suits,”181 the dissent invoked both Justice Harlan’s concurrence
in Bivens and the Court’s language in Passman to push back on
that argument:

this inquiry only after deciding in “Bivens step one” that the “state of the law gives Robbins no intuitively meritorious case for recognizing a new constitutional cause of action,
but neither does it plainly answer no to the question whether he should have it.” Wilkie,
551 US at 551, 554.
174 Wilkie, 551 US at 555–57.
175 Id at 561 (“[A]t this high level of generality, a Bivens action to redress retaliation
against those who resist Government impositions on their property rights would invite
claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property interests,
from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations.”).
176 Id.
177 Id at 562.
178 Wilkie, 551 US at 561 n 11.
179 Id at 562.
180 See id at 569 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181 Id (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The “floodgates” argument the Court today embraces has
been rehearsed and rejected before. In Passman, the Court
of Appeals emphasized, as a reason counseling denial of a
Bivens remedy, the danger of “deluging federal courts with
. . . claims.” . . . This Court disagreed, turning to Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Bivens to explain why. The
only serious policy argument against recognizing a right of
action for Bivens, Justice Harlan observed, was the risk of
inundating courts with Fourth Amendment claims. He
found the argument unsatisfactory.
...
In attributing heavy weight to the floodgates concern
pressed in this case, the Court today veers away from Justice Harlan’s sound counsel.182
After this thorough rejection of the floodgates argument, the dissent went on to give reasons why “one could securely forecast
that the flood the Court fears would not come to pass.”183 The
dissent then concluded by returning to its original position:
“[S]hutting the door to all plaintiffs . . . is a measure too
extreme.”184
The Bivens line of cases provides an unusually sharp illustration of the Court wrestling with the relevance of workload
concerns—particularly those involving frivolous cases—to the
substantive analysis of law. Early on, a majority of the justices
directly confronted the use of floodgates arguments and decisively stated that a possible increase in litigation simply was not a
sufficient—or even appropriate—reason to decide against recognizing a private right of action. More recently, the Court has
shown itself to be receptive to considering concerns about the
182 Wilkie, 551 US at 577 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Passman, 442 US at 248, and citing Bivens, 403 US at 410–11 (Harlan concurring).
183 Wilkie, 551 US at 581 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that “[i]f numerous Bivens claims would eventuate
were courts to entertain claims like Robbins’, then courts should already have encountered endeavors to mount Fifth Amendment Takings Clause suits under § 1983.” Id
(Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). She noted, however, that “the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General, and Robbins all agree[d] that there [were] no
reported cases on charges of retaliation by state officials against the exercise of Taking
Clause rights.” Id (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Robbins v
Wilkie, 433 F3d 755, 767 (10th Cir 2006), Brief for the Petitioners, Wilkie v Robbins, No
06-219, *48 (filed Jan 16, 2007) (available on Westlaw at 2007 WL 128587), and Brief for
the Respondent, Wilkie v Robbins, No 06-219, *31 (filed Feb 20, 2007) (available on
Westlaw at 2007 WL 550926).
184 Wilkie, 551 US at 582 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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workload of the federal courts in reaching its decisions. Just
what is responsible for this about-face is unclear. As scholars
have noted, the Court has been generally resistant to recognizing new Bivens claims in the years after Passman was decided.185 Although there are undoubtedly several moving pieces to
the Court’s shift in jurisprudence, one piece appears to be the
concern about workload itself—that is, it is possible that the justices became willing to include caseload concerns in their analysis precisely because they began to see the caseload as a greater
problem that needed somehow to be addressed. Whatever the
cause, this set of cases makes clear that at least some of the justices recently have been willing to take potential increases in litigation—particularly unmeritorious litigation—into account
when reaching a decision.
2. Habeas cases.
Bivens and its progeny demonstrate the prominence of, and
even controversy surrounding, floodgates arguments in cases involving judicial policy making. In the habeas context,186 the controversy changes shape as concerns about fidelity to statutory
text come to the fore. One of the first cases to raise concerns
about a deluge of new habeas claims, many of which would likely be frivolous, is the 1953 case of Brown v Allen.187 Allen is now
185 See note 171. Indeed, following the Court’s decision in Wilkie, judges and scholars alike have concluded that the Bivens doctrine has been greatly diminished. See, for
example, Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional
Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 NYU L Rev 681, 699 (2009) (“Bivens today appears to
be hanging by a thread.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional
Wrongs without Remedies after Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 Cato S Ct Rev 23, 26 (“[T]he best
that can be said of the Bivens doctrine is that it is on life support with little prospect of
recovery.”). This view was reinforced during October Term 2011, when the Court declined to find a Bivens action against federal contractors in Minneci v Pollard, 132 S Ct
617, 623 (2012). For a thoughtful analysis of the Court’s current Bivens jurisprudence,
see generally Carlos M. Vázquez and Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act,
and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U Pa L Rev 509 (2013).
186 Decisions that lead to an increase in habeas petitions of course also have some
impact on state courts. That said, the floodgates arguments raised in this set of cases
speak to concerns about flooding the federal courts, not the state courts, with claims. As
such, they are included only in this category.
Similarly, floodgates concerns in the context of habeas often tie in a concern about
Congress—specifically, whether a flood of cases will frustrate the purpose of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified in various sections of Title 28. Again, the cases in this set are ones in which the stated concern is primarily focused on the federal courts.
187 344 US 443 (1953). In point of fact, the Supreme Court considered three separate
cases in its opinion: Brown v Allen, Speller v Allen, and Daniels v Allen. Id at 443.
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seen as the case that “ushered in the modern era of federal habeas corpus,”188 standing for the proposition that constitutional
challenges considered in state court could nevertheless be raised
in a federal habeas petition.189 Justice Jackson had reservations
about the decision, and wrote separately to express his concern
about the effect of the Court’s decision on its habeas jurisprudence: “[T]his Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of
the writ [of habeas corpus] until floods of stale, frivolous and
repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and
swell our own.”190 The Justice then famously issued a warning
about these effects: “It must prejudice the occasional meritorious
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who
must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the
attitude that the needle is not worth the search.”191
Justice Jackson’s characteristically quotable opinion identified broad themes that have continued to animate the Court’s
habeas jurisprudence: the risk of obscuring meritorious habeas
claims in a sea of frivolous ones, and the possibility that frivolous cases might drown out cases in other areas of law. In habeas appeals, unlike in Bivens appeals, the justices have had to
consider how to balance these concerns often in the midst of
statutory interpretation—in deciphering either text or congressional intent.
In Harris v Reed,192 the Court considered whether a procedural-default rule would bar consideration of a federal claim on
habeas review if the state court rendering the judgment failed to
say clearly that its judgment rested on the procedural default.193
A majority of the Court decided that the answer was no,194 but
Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing that the Court’s decision
188 John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 Cornell L Rev 435, 440 (2011). See also
Max Rosenn, The Great Writ—A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 Ohio St L J 337, 345
(1983) (“The commencement of the modern era of habeas corpus may be traced to the
Court’s historic decision in 1953 in the Brown v. Allen cases.”).
189 Allen, 344 US at 458.
190 Id at 536 (Jackson concurring).
191 Id at 537 (Jackson concurring). Ultimately Justice Jackson joined in the result of
the case, but he espoused a different, more limited role for federal courts in the review of
habeas petitions. Id at 545–48. See also Richard H. Fallon Jr and Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1814–15
(1991) (describing Justice Jackson’s theory of habeas corpus from Brown v Allen).
192 489 US 255 (1989).
193 Id at 259–60.
194 Id at 266. See also Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104
Nw U L Rev 979, 1023 (2010) (delineating the majority’s analysis in the case).
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would have a harmful effect on the federal judiciary. Specifically, he argued that “[t]he majority’s decision can only increase
prisoner litigation and add to the burden on the federal
courts.”195 That burden, to Justice Kennedy, would be comprised
largely of unmeritorious claims: “It is well known ‘that prisoner
actions occupy a disproportionate amount of the time and energy
of the federal judiciary,’ and that many of these petitions are entirely frivolous.”196
The majority responded directly to Justice Kennedy’s dissent by claiming, as justices have in response to earlier floodgates arguments, that there was little reason to think that a
flood would be unleashed by its decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun argued that “the dissent’s fear that our
holding will submerge courts in a flood of improper prisoner petitions is unrealistic: a state court that wishes to rely on a procedural bar rule in a one-line pro forma order easily can write
that ‘relief is denied for reasons of procedural default.’” 197 Again,
the counterargument from the Court was not that a flood of cases would be irrelevant, but that no such flood was likely.
The floodgates debate in Harris echoed many of those discussed in the Bivens context: an argument was made that a potential decision would open the floodgates, which was followed
by a denial that the gates would actually be opened. In that
sense, Harris did not differ much from the policy-making cases
discussed above. But in Artuz v Bennett198 the Court found that
the statutory nature of the habeas question at issue flatly precluded the consideration of a potential flood.199 The question in
Artuz was whether an application for state postconviction relief
containing procedurally barred claims could nevertheless be
“properly filed” within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996200 (AEDPA).201 A unanimous
195

Harris, 489 US at 282 n 6 (Kennedy dissenting).
Id at 282–83 n 6 (Kennedy dissenting) (citation omitted), quoting Rose v Mitchell,
443 US 545, 584 (1979) (Powell concurring). Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that
“[i]n the year ending June 30, 1987, almost 10,000 habeas corpus petitions were filed by
state prisoners” and argued that “[t]his monumental burden is unlikely to be alleviated
by a rule that . . . requires federal courts to resolve the merits of defaulted claims.” Harris, 489 US at 282–83 n 6 (Kennedy dissenting).
197 Harris, 489 US at 265 n 12 (majority) (citation omitted).
198 531 US 4 (2000).
199 Id at 10.
200 Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified in various sections of Title 28.
201 Artuz, 531 US at 5 (“[T]he time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
196

1046

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:1007

Court held that it was.202 Toward the end of the opinion, the
Court took up a floodgates argument made by the respondent—
that allowing such claims would “trigger a flood of protective filings in federal courts, absorbing their resources in threshold interpretations of state procedural rules.”203 The Court quickly
dismissed the argument: “Whatever merits these and other policy arguments may have, it is not the province of this Court to
rewrite the statute to accommodate them. We hold as we do because respondent’s view seems to us the only permissible interpretation of the text.”204
Artuz contains important clues about the justices’ views on
the weight of court-centered floodgates concerns and how those
concerns can or should play a role in statutory interpretation. In
Artuz, the Court’s unanimity and the language of the decision
itself suggest that the Justices saw the question of statutory interpretation as a relatively straightforward one. By declining to
consider “policy arguments” about floodgates in the face of this
“only permissible interpretation,” the Justices did not rule out
the possibility of court-centered floodgates concerns playing a
role in other cases where the statutory language was less
clear.205
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”), quoting 28 USC § 2244(d)(2) (1994).
202 Artuz, 531 US at 10–11.
203 Id at 10.
204 Id. See also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
Colum L Rev 70, 108–09 & n 141 (2006) (describing how judges are bound by the means
Congress has selected for effectuating its purposes, and citing Artuz, among other cases,
for the proposition that this sentiment has “become common in the Court’s statutory
decisions”).
For an example of this reasoning outside the habeas context, see Neitzke v Williams,
490 US 319 (1989). In Neitzke, the Court considered the question “whether a complaint
filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) is automatically frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).” Id at 320.
Petitioning prison officials urged the Court to answer the question in the affirmative,
“primarily on the policy ground that such a reading will halt the ‘flood of frivolous litigation’ generated by prisoners that has swept over the federal judiciary.” Id at 325, quoting
Brief for Petitioners, Neitzke v Williams, No 87-1882, *7 (filed Nov 17, 1988) (available
on Westlaw at 1988 WL 1025738). The Court ultimately concluded,
[O]ur role in appraising petitioners’ reading of § 1915(d) is not to make policy,
but to interpret a statute. Taking this approach, it is evident that the failureto-state-a-claim standard of Rule 12(b)(6) and the frivolousness standard of §
1915(d) were devised to serve distinctive goals . . . [but] it does not follow that a
complaint which falls afoul of the former standard will invariably fall afoul of
the latter.
Neitzke, 490 US at 326.
205 Artuz, 531 US at 10.
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And in fact, in a series of 5–4 decisions following Artuz, the
Court seemed to back away from the apparently definitive rejection of court-centered floodgates concerns in statutory cases. In
deciding that a timely filed petition that contained procedurally
barred claims was “properly filed” within § 2244(d)(2) of AEDPA,
the Court in Artuz explicitly reserved the question of whether a
petition rejected by the state court as untimely could still be
“properly filed” under the same section.206 Pace v DiGuglielmo207
confronted that question. A majority of the Court held that the
answer was no and that the federal petition at issue in the case
was time barred.208 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented. They argued that the majority’s result was not compelled by the text of the provision and,
moreover, that it would frustrate the purpose of that provision—
the need to avoid burdening district courts:209 “Unfortunately,
the most likely consequence of the Court’s new rule will be to increase, not reduce, delays in the federal system. The inevitable
result of today’s decision will be a flood of protective filings in
the federal district courts.”210 Although Justice Stevens framed
his argument partially in terms of being deferential to Congress,211 he also made clear that his concern was with flooding
federal courts with petitions, arguing, “I fail to see any merit in
a rule that knowingly and unnecessarily ‘add[s] to the burdens on the district courts in a way that simple tolling . . .
would not.’” 212
Finally, the same court-centered floodgates concerns that
were rejected in Artuz and accepted by four Justices in Pace apparently drove the outcome in the 2007 case of Schriro v Landrigan.213 In Schriro, the Court held that a district court did not
abuse its discretion, as defined by AEDPA, when it denied a
convicted state prisoner an evidentiary hearing in connection
with his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.214 The same four
Justices who dissented in Pace also dissented in Schriro, though

206

Id at 8–9 & n 2.
544 US 408 (2005).
208 Id at 410.
209 Id at 420 (Stevens dissenting).
210 Id at 429 (Stevens dissenting).
211 See Pace, 544 US at 427 (Stevens dissenting). See also note 186.
212 Pace, 544 US at 429 (Stevens dissenting) (alterations in original), quoting Duncan v Walker, 533 US 167, 192 (2001) (Breyer dissenting).
213 550 US 465 (2007).
214 Id at 472–73.
207
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this time they came out the other way on floodgates concerns.
Justice Stevens, again joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, made plain that he thought the majority’s decision was
motivated by a concern about case volume, stating, “In the end,
the Court’s decision can only be explained by its increasingly
familiar effort to guard the floodgates of litigation.”215 Relying
upon the floodgates leitmotif, the dissenting Justices made the
argument that a flood was unlikely to follow from their proposed
holding:
[H]abeas cases requiring evidentiary hearings have been
“few in number,” and “there is no clear evidence that this
particular classification of habeas proceedings has burdened
the dockets of the federal courts.” Even prior to the passage
of [AEDPA], district courts held evidentiary hearings in only 1.17% of all federal habeas cases. This figure makes it
abundantly clear that doing justice does not always cause
the heavens to fall.216
In short, within just a few-year span the Court had done something of an about-face; the same Justices who were earlier worried about flooding the courts with protective filings in Pace
were now suggesting, somewhat disparagingly, that the majority
was being motivated by case volume concerns in Schriro (and
according to the dissent, the Justices who had earlier failed to
embrace the floodgates argument found it dispositive this time
around).
A close reading of this set of habeas cases217 demonstrates a
few critical points. First, the Court has consistently been sensitive

215 Id at 499 (Stevens dissenting). As evidence of this motivation, the dissent noted
that the majority had commented on how requiring the hearing would affect the lower
federal courts:

Immediately before turning to the facts of this case, [the majority] states that
“[i]f district courts were required to allow federal habeas applicants to develop
even the most insubstantial factual allegations in evidentiary hearings, district
courts would be forced to reopen factual disputes that were conclusively resolved in the state courts.”
Id (Stevens dissenting) (second alteration in original), quoting id at 475 (majority).
216 Schriro, 550 US at 499–500 (Stevens dissenting) (citations omitted), quoting
Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 504 US 1, 24 (Kennedy dissenting).
217 An additional data point can be found beyond the set of traditional habeas cases.
In Ryder v United States, 515 US 177 (1995), the Court held that the actions of two civilian judges who served on the Court of Military Review, but who had not been appointed
in accordance with the dictates of the Appointments Clause, were not valid de facto. Id at
179. The Court reached its holding over a concern on the part of the government that “a
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to how its decisions will affect the future volume of claims coming into federal courts—particularly frivolous ones. Second,
while, as in the Bivens context, numerous factors are at work in
these different decisions, one such factor in this context seems to
be the clarity of the underlying statutory provision. The Justices
unanimously rejected floodgates considerations in Artuz on the
ground that the text in question led to a clear result. Absent
straightforward interpretation, the justices appear to have been
willing to turn to floodgates reasoning. And third, in cases that
lack the straightforward statutory interpretation present in
Artuz, the Court has fractured, and indeed, the justices themselves have gone back and forth, on just when floodgates reasoning should be dispositive.218
3. Prisoner cases.
The Bivens cases showed the Court considering arguments
about increasing frivolous filings in the context of judicial policy
making; the habeas cases showed the same for statutory interpretation. To round out the picture of how the Court has addressed these concerns, it is worth considering cases that raise
floodgates arguments in the constitutional realm.
Here, it is useful to look to a set of constitutional challenges in which concerns about future litigation have consistently
flood of habeas corpus petitions will ensue”—a concern that the Court dismissed, without
further elaboration, as having “little basis” in past precedent. Id at 185.
218 Bringing the point full circle, several of the Justices recently returned to Justice
Jackson’s language in Allen to express their own concerns about the current state of habeas corpus:
It has now been 60 years since Brown v. Allen, in which we struck the Faustian
bargain that traded the simple elegance of the common-law writ of habeas corpus for federal-court power to probe the substantive merits of state-court convictions. Even after AEDPA’s pass through the Augean stables, no one in a position to observe the functioning of our byzantine federal-habeas system can
believe it an efficient device for separating the truly deserving from the multitude of prisoners pressing false claims. “[F]loods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our own. . . . It
must prejudice the occasional meritorious applicant to be buried in a flood of
worthless ones.”
The “inundation” that Justice Jackson lamented in 1953 “consisted of 541” federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. By 1969, that number had grown
to 7,359. In the year ending on September 30, 2012, 15,929 such petitions were
filed. Today’s decision piles yet more dead weight onto a postconviction habeas
system already creaking at its rusted joints.
McQuiggin, 133 S Ct at 1942–43 (Scalia dissenting) (citations omitted).
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appeared: cases brought by prisoners. As noted earlier, the justices have long been wary of frivolous prisoner filings,219 and in
several cases, they have considered whether to factor concerns
about increasing frivolous filings into their decisions. Although
the justices have considered the possibility of new cases arising
from a variety of decisions,220 it will suffice to examine two—one
challenging a search within a cell and another challenging the
use of excessive force—that largely involve Fourth and Eighth
Amendment claims, respectively.
The first example is the 1984 case Hudson v Palmer,221 in
which a majority of the Court held that an inmate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell such that he was
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.222 Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented,
challenging both the merits of the decision223 and the motivation
behind it: “I cannot help but think that the Court’s holding is influenced by an unstated fear that if it recognizes that prisoners
219 See, for example, Harris, 489 US at 282–83 n 6 (Kennedy dissenting) (“It is well
known ‘that prisoner actions occupy a disproportionate amount of the time and energy of
the federal judiciary,’ and that many of these petitions are entirely frivolous.”), quoting
Rose v Mitchell, 443 US 545, 584 (1979) (Powell concurring); Cruz v Beto, 405 US 319,
326–27 (1972) (Rehnquist dissenting) (“The inmate stands to gain something and lose
nothing from a complaint stating facts that he is ultimately unable to prove. Though he
may be denied legal relief, he will nonetheless have obtained a short sabbatical in the
nearest federal courthouse.”).
220 For examples of cases in which the Court has considered whether a flood of cases
will follow from decisions based on the manner of execution, see Baze v Rees, 553 US 35,
70 (2008) (Alito concurring) (arguing that the dissent’s proposed standard of whether the
manner of execution would create an “untoward” risk of pain “would open the gates for a
flood of litigation that would go a long way toward bringing about the end of the death
penalty as a practical matter”); Nelson v Campbell, 541 US 637, 649 (2004):

Respondents argue that a decision to reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit would open the floodgates to all manner of method-of-execution challenges,
as well as last minute stay requests. But, because we do not here resolve the
question of how to treat method-of-execution claims generally, our holding is
extremely limited.
There of course have also been prisoner cases outside the constitutional realm that raise
floodgates concerns. See, for example, Cleavinger v Saxner, 474 US 193, 207 (1985) (“We
[ ] are not impressed with the argument that anything less than absolute immunity [for
members of federal prison’s Institution Discipline Committee] will result in a flood of
litigation and in substantial procedural burdens and expense for committee members.”).
221 468 US 517 (1984).
222 See id at 530. See also Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 Stan L Rev 503, 521 (2007) (describing the Court’s expectation-of-privacy analysis in Palmer).
223 Palmer, 468 US at 558 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that affording an inmate no constitutional protection over his own property—from “a
photo of a child to a letter from a wife”—contravened a longstanding “ethical tradition”).
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have any Fourth Amendment protection this will lead to a flood
of frivolous lawsuits.”224 He then responded to this possible motivation by stating that “[o]f course, this type of burden is not sufficient to justify a judicial modification of the requirements of
law.”225 Justice Stevens went on to suggest that no reason existed to think that a flood of cases would even come, claiming that
“the lower courts have permitted such suits to be brought for
some time now without disastrous results.”226
These arguments presaged those that Justice Stevens would
later make in his Pace and Schriro dissents—the habeas cases
discussed above. But in Palmer, Justice Stevens went on to suggest other ways that courts could protect themselves from potential floods instead of “modif[ying]” the “requirements of law.”227
Specifically, he argued that “costs can be awarded against the
plaintiff when frivolous cases are brought. Even modest assessments against prisoners’ accounts could provide an effective
weapon for deterring truly groundless litigation.”228
Eight years later, the Court was less willing to embrace a
floodgates argument. In Hudson v McMillian,229 the Court confronted whether the use of “excessive physical force” against an
inmate violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment when the inmate does not actually suffer serious injury.230 Justice O’Connor, writing for a majority of the Court, answered that question in the affirmative.231 The
Court reached its holding over the arguments made by respondents, who were joined by five states as amici curiae, that limiting Eighth Amendment violations to those involving “significant
injury” was necessary to limit the number of filings by inmates.232 Although the majority did not address the propriety of

224

Id at 554 n 30 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226 Id (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
227 Palmer, 468 US at 554 n 30 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228 Id (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted), citing
Hoover v Ronwin, 466 US 558, 601 n 27 (1984) (Stevens dissenting).
229 503 US 1 (1992).
230 Id at 4. See also Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth
Amendment, 84 NYU L Rev 881, 905–06 (2009) (generally assessing the facts of the
case).
231 McMillian, 503 US at 4.
232 Id at 14 (Blackmun concurring), citing Brief Amici Curiae for the States of Texas,
Hawaii, Nevada, Wyoming, and Florida, Hudson v McMillian, No 90-6531, *21 (filed Aug
12, 1991) (available on Lexis at 1990 US Briefs 6531) (“Texas Amicus Brief”). Texas, in
particular, noted that the “significant injury requirement has been very effective in the
225

1052

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:1007

these arguments, Justice Blackmun took them on directly in his
concurrence: “This audacious approach to the Eighth Amendment assumes that the interpretation of an explicit constitutional protection is to be guided by pure policy preferences for
the paring down of prisoner petitions. . . . [T]his inherently
self-interested concern has no appropriate role in interpreting the
contours of a substantive constitutional right.”233
Of course, this very same “inherently self-interested concern” had, at least according to the dissenters, shaped the
Court’s decision less than a decade earlier in Palmer. After
forcefully rejecting the validity of that concern in McMillian,
Justice Blackmun went on to argue that, “in any event,” the
Court’s ruling “does not open the floodgates for filings by prison
inmates.”234 The Justice pointed to several other gatekeeping
mechanisms already in place, including that inmates were required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, and
that the district court could dismiss an inmate’s complaint in
forma pauperis if the court was satisfied that the action was
frivolous or malicious.235 Justice Blackmun concluded that “[t]hese
measures should be adequate to control any docket-management
problems that might result from meritless prisoner claims.”236
In neither of these two decisions—Palmer and McMillian—
did a majority of the Court openly rely on floodgates arguments
as a consideration in interpreting the Constitution. That said, if
the dissent in Palmer is to be believed, concerns about creating
more unmeritorious litigation played a significant role in driving
the Court’s decision in that case. It is therefore interesting that,
not long after, the Court did not accept the floodgates argument
in McMillian, and one Justice went so far as to express hostility
to the suggestion that it would. Although these two cases alone
cannot provide a comprehensive account of how the Court has
viewed court-centered floodgates arguments regarding frivolous
cases in the constitutional realm, they suggest, consistent with
the other cases discussed here, that the Court has wrestled with
when it can consider these concerns, and certainly has not
barred their consideration.

Fifth Circuit in helping to control its system-wide docket management problems.”
McMillian, 503 US at 4 (Blackmun concurring), quoting Texas Amicus Brief at *21.
233 McMillian, 503 US at 15 (Blackmun concurring) (emphasis added).
234 Id (Blackmun concurring).
235 Id at 15–16 (Blackmun concurring).
236 Id at 16 (Blackmun concurring).
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In short, these cases together paint a picture about how the
Court has struggled with whether and when to take into account
its concerns about increasing the federal courts’ caseload—
particularly with frivolous cases. Justices and various parties
have raised these concerns numerous times over the past several
decades. Sometimes a majority of the Court is receptive, as in
Wilkie;237 other times the Court rejects all such considerations,
as in Artuz.238 Part of the story, of course, is under what circumstances the Court is asked to contemplate increases in litigation.
It should be no surprise that some of the Court’s soundest rejections of these considerations have come in cases in which it is interpreting a statute or a constitutional right. Yet it is important
to recognize that floodgates reasoning comes into play even in
these cases, and important as well to recognize that even in the
policy-making realm of Bivens, the Court has vacillated on
whether court-centered concerns can appropriately be taken into
account in reaching a substantive decision. A close analysis of
these cases reveals the fragility of the Court’s position, in turn
suggesting the fragility of its normative foundation.239
B.

Burdening the Courts with Standard Claims

The previous Section demonstrated that concerns about inundating the federal courts with frivolous cases seem to have
shaped at least some of the Court’s decisions. One might wonder
how the Court has responded to cases in which the merits of the
claims in the flood were not in doubt. As it turns out, even in
those cases, members of the Court apparently have been receptive to floodgates concerns.
As one prominent example, floodgates concerns were
raised—and were perhaps deeply influential—in the gerrymandering case of Vieth v Jubelirer240 in 2004. The case involved a
challenge to a Pennsylvania redistricting plan on the ground
that it constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander.241
A plurality of the Court decided that the claims were nonjusticiable.242 In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that the plurality
237

See notes 173–77 and accompanying text.
See notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
239 See Part IV.
240 541 US 267 (2004).
241 Id at 271 (plurality).
242 Id at 306. See also Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court,
Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U Pa L Rev 503, 506 (2004).
238
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was swayed by a floodgates fear: “The plurality’s reluctance to
recognize the justiciability of partisan gerrymanders seems
driven in part by a fear that recognizing such claims will give
rise to a flood of litigation.”243 The Justice then gave one of the
typical floodgates rejoinders—arguing that a flood was unlikely
to follow. Noting that the plurality had compiled a list of gerrymandering cases since the 1986 case of Davis v Bandemer,244
Justice Stevens wrote: “[T]he list of cases that [the plurality]
cites in its lengthy footnote suggests that in the two decades
since Bandemer, there has been an average of just three or four
partisan gerrymandering cases filed every year.”245 To put that
figure in perspective, the Justice noted that it “is obviously trivial when compared, for example, to the amount of litigation that
followed our adoption of the ‘one-person, one-vote’ rule.”246 If
Justice Stevens’s account of what was motivating the majority is
correct, Vieth provides an example not just of the Court altering
a decision out of general floodgates concerns, but also of the
Court deciding not to review a case at all.
More recently, Justice Sotomayor similarly pushed back on
what she took to be the workload concerns of the majority. In
Perry v New Hampshire,247 the Justice challenged the majority’s
assessment that requiring an inquiry into the reliability of an
eyewitness identification beyond police-arranged suggestive circumstances would “entail a heavy practical burden” on the lower
courts.248 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted, inter alia,
that “[t]here has been no flood of claims in the four Federal Circuits that, having seen no basis for an arrangement-based distinction in our precedents, have long indicated that due process
scrutiny applies to all suggestive identification procedures.”249
Justice Sotomayor invoked the flood metaphor to dispel the notion that extending the requirement of a reliability inquiry
would actually lead to an increase in the burden on lower
courts—a factor that appeared relevant to the majority.250
243

Vieth, 541 US at 326 n 14 (Stevens dissenting).
478 US 109 (1986).
245 Vieth, 541 US at 326 n 14 (Stevens dissenting) (citation omitted).
246 Id (Stevens dissenting), citing Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964).
247 132 S Ct 716 (2012).
248 Id at 737–38 (Sotomayor dissenting).
249 Id (Sotomayor dissenting).
250 See id at 727 (majority). Again, this is not to suggest that workload was a dispositive or even significant factor to the Court in Perry. For an analysis of the Court’s reasoning in the case and its jurisprudence on eyewitness identifications more broadly, see
generally Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 Vand L Rev 451 (2012).
244
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And in an interesting twist, four dissenting Justices suggested that the majority had failed to sufficiently take floodgates
concerns into account in the 2011 case Stern v Marshall.251 The
core questions in that case were whether a bankruptcy court
judge had the statutory authority to enter a final judgment on a
counterclaim for tortious interference and, if so, whether that
statutory authority violated Article III of the Constitution.252
The majority concluded that the answer to both questions was
yes, meaning that from that point on, compulsory counterclaims
could not be resolved in bankruptcy courts.253 Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, dissented,
and devoted an entire section of the opinion to the practical consequences of the Court’s decision:
[U]nder the majority’s holding, the federal district judge,
not the bankruptcy judge, would have to hear and resolve
the counterclaim. Why is that a problem? Because these
types of disputes arise in bankruptcy court with some frequency. Because the volume of bankruptcy cases is staggering, involving almost 1.6 million filings last year, compared
to a federal district court docket of around 280,000 civil cases and 78,000 criminal cases. . . . Because under these circumstances, a constitutionally required game of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts would lead to inefficiency,
increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering
among those faced with bankruptcy.254
What is unclear from this section is how the dissenting Justices
thought the volume concerns should affect the Court’s decision.
Unlike the majority, the dissent concluded that the statute was
constitutional; one is left to wonder, then, if the dissent meant to
imply that the majority should have similarly adopted a broader
reading of Article III to avoid these results.255 What is clear,

251

131 S Ct 2594 (2011).
Id at 2600.
253 Id at 2620. See also Rafael I. Pardo and Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L Rev 384, 417–18 (2012).
254 Stern, 131 S Ct at 2630 (Breyer dissenting) (citations omitted).
255 The majority, for its part, responded to this concern (as raised by the estate of
Vickie Lynn Marshall and amici) by stating: “It goes without saying that ‘the fact that a
given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.’” Id at 2619
(majority), quoting INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 944 (1983). The Court went on to note
that “[i]n addition, we are not convinced that the practical consequences of such limitations
252

1056

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:1007

however, is that the dissent thought an increase in filings to the
district court was a truly problematic byproduct of the Court’s
decision and, it seems, should even somehow have been factored
into that decision.
In all of these cases, at least some members of the Court
were concerned about—or concerned that other members of the
Court were concerned about—how the federal judiciary would be
affected by a significant increase in caseload. And importantly,
neither Vieth nor Perry contains even a suggestion that the merits of the claims in the flood had anything to do with the majority’s apparent desire to avoid them. Likewise, the dissenting Justices in Stern made plain that their concern was with how the
judiciary would face a higher number of cases, not frivolous cases, and how the eventual delays would affect the parties. In light
of the strain that has existed on these courts over the past several decades, the underlying fear in all these cases seems to be
that an expansion of the docket will simply make it more difficult for the courts to administer justice. Ultimately, the fact that
the Court has gone back and forth on whether and when to take
these concerns into account reveals the shaky foundation that
the court-centered floodgates argument rests upon. In the final
Part, I begin to address the normative questions about using all
manner of floodgates arguments in shaping substantive law.
IV. EVALUATING FLOODGATES ARGUMENTS
The preceding Parts have identified and unpacked the primary types of floodgates arguments that the Supreme Court has
considered. In doing so, however, the discussion has underscored
a set of difficult normative questions: Should floodgates arguments ever be considered in the Court’s decision making? If so,
when and why? And in such cases where it might be legitimate
for the Court to rely on floodgates reasoning, is it sufficient for a
party or the Court itself to assert that a deluge of cases will
surely follow, or is more required to turn the outcome of the
case? In light of the fact that the justices have considered such
arguments in more than sixty cases256—and this consideration
has increased significantly over the last few terms257—the need

on the authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments are as significant as Vickie and the dissent suggest.” Stern, 131 S Ct at 2619.
256 See note 31.
257 See note 3 and accompanying text.
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to have purchase on these questions has become all the more
pressing.
Answering these questions is no easy task. It is no accident
that the Court has fractured—and, indeed, that individual justices have gone back and forth—on these very matters. A large
part of the difficulty lies in the fact that these questions cannot
be answered in a wholesale manner. As the preceding discussion
demonstrates, floodgates arguments vary considerably based
upon the institution that is being affected by the flood and what
kinds of cases the feared flood contains.
And yet, what makes these questions challenging to answer
is also what illuminates one way to begin to answer them. As
the analysis here shows, floodgates arguments often are best
understood as a subset of a larger category of normative arguments—about the relationship between courts and Congress, for
example, or about the relationship between the federal and state
court systems. The primary goal of this Part is to situate the
various floodgates arguments in the appropriate normative contexts. As this Part demonstrates, once situated, the use of some
floodgates arguments becomes fairly easily defensible, while the
use of others—precisely because they are not supported by accepted lines of doctrine and practice—becomes far more questionable.
Specifically, Part IV.A considers the arguments based on
other-regarding concerns—both interbranch and intersystemic—
and argues that they are tied to the constitutional principles of
separation of powers and federalism, as well as the doctrines of
qualified immunity and abstention. These ties, in turn, suggest
that the consideration of other-regarding floodgates is defensible. To be clear, the fact that these floodgates arguments have
footing in constitutional principles and doctrine does not suggest
that they should be immune from scrutiny or that they should
always prevail; the point is simply that this grounding at least
gives them a prima facie claim to legitimacy.
Part IV.B then considers court-centered floodgates arguments and finds them to be on shakier ground. The Court is vindicating no well-established constitutional principle when it defends the federal courts’ docket from caseload pressures, and
these arguments have no clear doctrinal or theoretical analogue.
The use of court-centered floodgates arguments therefore requires some affirmative justification, which neither the Court
nor commentators have provided. Moreover, there is reason to
be skeptical of this kind of prudential argument, as shaping the
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docket of the federal courts is generally understood to come under the purview of Congress, and not the Court. Accordingly,
this Section concludes that the justices should let the lower
courts rely on the other tools that they have at their disposal—
such as case-management practices258—to respond to docket
pressures, rather than altering substantive law.
The remaining objective of this Part is to briefly consider
the follow-up question to the central normative one—that is, if
there are some circumstances in which it is defensible for the
Court to entertain a floodgates argument, what kind of analysis
or even evidence is required to affect the outcome of a case? Accordingly, Part IV.C offers some initial thoughts on the minimum amount of support a floodgates argument should have for
that argument to be dispositive.
A.

Interbranch and Intersystemic Concerns

Many of the floodgates arguments are “other regarding”—
meaning that the Court considers them to avoid encroaching upon Congress, burdening the executive, or upsetting the balance
between the federal and state court systems. Each of these concerns can be connected in some way to basic structural constitutional principles or doctrinal rules that courts employ in a variety of contexts to deny parties the relief they might otherwise
receive so that the courts can protect another government institution or dynamic with that institution. This gives otherregarding floodgates arguments a relatively stable normative
footing that helps justify their consideration.
1. Judicial-legislative concerns.
The floodgates arguments that are most easily defensible
are the ones raised in the judicial-legislative context. As discussed in Part I.B, the justices have considered two major concerns within this context. The first is that a flood of new cases
following a particular statutory decision would be problematic
because it would demonstrate that the Court had contravened
congressional intent and possibly even demonstrate the degree
of that transgression. A classic example of this kind of concern
comes from Justice Douglas’s dissent in De Beers: “The decision,
if followed, will open the flood gates to review of interlocutory

258

See generally Levy, 61 Duke L J 315 (cited in note 35).
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decrees. It circumvents the policy of Congress to restrict review
in these cases to final judgments.”259 The second subset of concerns is an extension of the first—specifically, that a flood of new
cases would not just demonstrate a disregard for congressional
intent but, in fact, an appropriation of the legislative function
through unilateral expansion of jurisdiction. This sentiment is
captured well by Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Solem, which
described the Court’s decision as “judicial usurpation with a
vengeance.”260
The normative foundations of these two forms of judiciallegislative floodgates arguments are not difficult to identify, nor,
for many, are they hard to embrace. Within the first kind of
floodgates argument, the justices are endeavoring to construe
the law correctly, and using the possibility of a flood as an indication that the Court has failed to do so. In this way, the floodgates argument becomes part and parcel of an approach to statutory interpretation that tries to give effect to the apparent
intention or purpose of Congress.261 The second type of floodgates
argument is an extension of the first, in that the justices are
concerned that the Court’s reading of a particular statute is so
removed from what Congress intended that it essentially
amounts to a usurpation of the legislative function. In this way,
the floodgates arguments raised in the judicial-legislative context can be justified by basic separation-of-powers principles. At
bottom, they are supported by the age old notion that each
branch has its “proper place[ ],”262 with Congress as the primary
lawmaker and the Court as the law interpreter,263 and neither
should invade the territory of another.264
259

De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 225 (Douglas dissenting).
Solem, 463 US at 315 (Burger dissenting).
261 The Court has routinely recognized this approach to statutory interpretation.
See, for example, Flora v United States, 357 US 63, 65 (1958) (“In matters of statutory
construction the duty of this Court is to give effect to the intent of Congress.”).
262 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 347–48 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob
E. Cooke, ed).
263 See, for example, National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S
Ct 2566, 2579 (2012) (“Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret
the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments.
Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders.”); Hepburn v Griswold, 75
US 603, 611 (1869) (“All the legislative power granted by the Constitution belongs to
Congress.”). Members of Congress have likewise echoed this sentiment. See, for example,
Hearings on the Nomination of H. Lee Sarokin to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 27,526 (1994) (statement of
Senator Phil Gramm) (“Sarokin Hearings”) (“[J]udges ought to be in the business of interpreting laws, not making them.”); Sarokin Hearings, 103d Cong, 2d Sess at 27,470
260
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To be clear, claiming that judicial-legislative floodgates arguments have a prima facie legitimacy does not mean that reasonable minds cannot differ on the matter of when these arguments should be heeded. For example, there can be
disagreements about whether the text of a particular statute is
sufficiently clear such that one need not take into account the
overarching purpose of the statute. Or even if there is agreement that congressional will is relevant, there can be disagreement about what that will is and how a potential flood of litigation would support or contravene it. The greater point is simply
that these are arguments of a kind that we have seen before—
they are part and parcel of a type of statutory interpretation
with ties to separation of powers, and therefore their consideration is generally defensible.
2. Judicial-executive concerns.
Floodgates arguments made to protect the executive from
becoming overburdened and to ensure a balance between the
federal and state courts stand on less-sure footing. Although
considering the possibility of a flood so as not to disregard congressional intent fits comfortably with familiar themes in statutory interpretation, that the Court has grounds to consider a
flood while engaging in substantive analysis in these other areas
is less clear. In particular, if Congress had wanted the Court to
become involved in guarding these floodgates of litigation, it
could have said so in framing the relevant substantive law. That
said, even these arguments can be understood to have ties to
familiar constitutional principles and lines of doctrine that
(statement of Senator Orrin Hatch) (“What are judges for other than to implement the
laws, to abide by them, to interpret them, not to make them.”); Hearings on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 23,612 (1991)
(statement of Senator Arlen Specter) (“Thomas Hearings”) (“[T]he Court is supposed to
interpret law, not to make law.”). For these and similar statements, see Bernard W. Bell,
R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 NC L Rev
1253, 1254 n 1 (2000).
264 Federalist 48 (Madison), in The Federalist 332, 332 (cited in note 262) (describing
power dynamics and potential consequences). See also Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US
447, 488 (1923):
The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To the legislative department has been committed the duty of making laws; to the executive
the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and
applying them in cases properly brought before the courts. The general rule is
that neither department may invade the province of the other and neither may
control, direct or restrain the action of the other.
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protect the executive and state courts from excessive burdens—
ties which lend legitimacy to the use of these arguments.
In the judicial-executive context, one prominent animating
concern is that deciding a case in a particular way would create
litigation that would ultimately burden the executive official in
question. That burden, in turn, would make it difficult for the
official to perform his duties. This is precisely the issue that Justice Blackmun raised in Bivens when he argued that an increase
in lawsuits would “stultify” law enforcement265 and that President Clinton raised in Jones when he argued that additional litigation would “impair the effective performance of his office.”266
When understood in these terms, the executive floodgates arguments share much in common with the doctrine of qualified
immunity.
As the Court itself has stated, immunity of public officers
arose “to shield them from undue interference with their duties
and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”267 This is why
the Court has “consistently [ ] held that government officials are
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.”268 As
a result, parties can be denied the relief that they would otherwise receive, all to protect the executive from what the Court
has called the “burdens of litigation.”269 Floodgates arguments in
the context of the executive are based on the same principle. In
the cases discussed here, the argument is that a private right of
action should not be recognized or that litigation should be
stayed—that is, parties should at least be temporarily denied
the relief that they might otherwise receive—in order to protect
the executive from burdensome litigation.
Of course, this analogy has its limits, and the purpose of
drawing it is not to suggest that all executive floodgates arguments should prevail. Indeed, one might be inclined to reject the
line of argument that seeks to protect members of the executive
branch from burdensome litigation for a whole host of reasons.

265

Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting).
Jones, 520 US at 701–02.
267 Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 806 (1982). See also James E. Pfander and
Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 NYU L Rev 1862, 1870 (2010) (noting how
courts today view the purpose of qualified immunity as balancing the need to compensate victims with ensuring that public officials are not “chill[ed]” in “the zealous discharge of their appointed duties”).
268 Harlow, 457 US at 806.
269 Saucier v Katz, 533 US 194, 200–01 (2001).
266
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The point is simply that the Court has relied upon some of the
same concerns to justify creating immunity from suit before.270
As such, floodgates arguments that are animated by a concern
for shielding the executive have at least some legal footing,
thereby rendering their consideration defensible.271
3. Intersystemic concerns.
The same may be said for the Court’s consideration of intersystemic floodgates arguments. In the intersystemic realm, the
Court has raised concerns in two nearly opposite directions—
taking away too many cases that belong in state courts and
flooding state courts with too many claims and obligations. A
prime example of the first type of concern can be seen in Maze,
in which Chief Justice Burger suggested that the majority was
motivated by a desire “not to flood the federal courts” with cases
perceived to be “more appropriately the business of the
States.”272 Justice Ginsburg raised this same concern in her dissent in Shady Grove, suggesting that, because of the Court’s decision, federal courts would now become a “mecca” for “class actions seeking state-created penalties for claims arising under
state law.”273 The second concern is on display in the parentaltermination cases—first Lassiter274 and then M.L.B.275—in which
the Justices’ concern appears to be burdening state courts with
too many claims and attendant obligations, such as providing
parties with free transcripts.
Both concerns are about volume, to be sure, but they are also about ensuring, in the words of the Grable Court, that there
is no “distort[ion] in the “division of labor between the state and
federal courts.”276 In this way, these kinds of floodgates arguments can be understood as having ties to federalism by maintaining “a healthy balance” between the federal and state
270 As currently construed by the Court, qualified immunity is an immunity from
suit, and not simply a defense on the merits. See Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 237
(2009).
271 In a similar vein, one can make the argument that floodgates arguments in the
judicial-executive context bear some resemblance to political question doctrine, which
likewise safeguards certain executive actions from judicial scrutiny on the ground that
the executive needs freedom of action. Thanks to Professor Stephen Sachs for suggesting
this argument.
272 Maze, 414 US at 407 (Burger dissenting).
273 Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 130 S Ct at 1473 (Ginsburg dissenting).
274 Lassiter, 452 US at 58–59 (Blackmun dissenting).
275 M.L.B., 519 US at 129–30 (Thomas dissenting).
276 Grable & Sons Metal Products, 545 US at 310.
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courts.277 Moreover, these concerns link up to those that the
Court has used in the past as grounds to refuse to hear claims
through various forms of abstention. Specifically, in the cases of
Railroad Commission of Texas v Pullman Co,278 Burford v Sun
Oil Co,279 and Louisiana Power & Light Co v City of
Thibodaux,280 the Court fashioned atextual rules to avoid hearing cases that would be heard in state court for the purpose of,
inter alia, avoiding “friction” between state and federal courts.281
In these and related cases,282 the Court essentially defers to the
state courts—at least for some time—so that the states can handle their own business. For this reason, abstention has been described as a form of “judicial federalism”283—it is a prime example of a federal court ceding authority to a state court so as not
to upset the balance between the two.
In this way, intersystemic floodgates arguments bear some
resemblance to the kinds of analytic moves that the Court has
already made. Both involve deciding a case in a particular way
so as to avoid creating a tension with the state courts, and ultimately, upsetting the balance between the federal and state
277

See Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 457–58 (1991):

As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.
...
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of
government power. . . . Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front.
278

312 US 496 (1941).
319 US 315 (1943).
280 360 US 25 (1959).
281 James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention
Doctrine, 46 Stan L Rev 1049, 1051 & n 6 (1994), citing Thibodaux, 360 US at 35 (Brennan dissenting), Burford, 319 US at 335–36 (Douglas concurring), and Pullman, 312 US
at 500.
282 See, for example, Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 43–44, 54 (1971) (fashioning an
abstention doctrine to protect the autonomy of proceedings in state court from federal
interference).
283 Richard H. Fallon Jr, Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 SLU L J
693, 723 (2009) (“The Hart and Wechsler casebook styles the chapter on abstention doctrines as one on ‘Judicial Federalism.’ This label is apt: By abstaining, a federal court
typically cedes authority to a state court, and considerations of federalism will sometimes weigh heavily in favor of a federal court’s doing so.”). See also Ernest A. Young,
“The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption against Preemption in the Roberts
Court, 2011 S Ct Rev 253, 315 n 332 (describing the judicial abstention doctrines as
“based on broad notions of federalism”).
279
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court systems. Again, this analogy has its limits, and the point
is certainly not that floodgates arguments made in the service of
intersystemic concerns should always prevail in court. Rather,
the point is simply that these arguments fit within an established area of doctrine. Accordingly, as with floodgates arguments in the judicial-executive context, intersystemic floodgates
arguments have a prima facie claim to legitimacy.
Ultimately the question of whether the use of otherregarding floodgates arguments can be justified is a complicated
one. The way to begin to answer the question is to look to context—specifically, the institutions and the underlying concerns
about those institutions at stake. When framed this way, the
kinds of floodgates arguments that have arisen in the judiciallegislative context can best be understood as fitting comfortably
with familiar themes in statutory interpretation. Accordingly,
their consideration is easily defensible. The kinds of floodgates
arguments that have arisen in the judicial-executive and intersystemic contexts are arguably somewhat more difficult to embrace. That said, other areas of the law—namely qualified immunity and abstention—serve as prime examples of the Court
intervening, on its own, to protect other government actors from
harmful litigation and to preserve the relationship between the
state and federal courts more generally. By analogy, these kinds
of floodgates arguments too have a legitimate basis. In short, by
recognizing that other-regarding floodgates arguments fit within
established areas of doctrine and practice, it becomes clear that
the Court should be able to entertain or even raise such arguments on its own.
B.

Court-Centered Concerns

As the earlier Parts have demonstrated, floodgates arguments that express court-centered concerns are fundamentally
different from those that express interbranch or intersystemic
concerns. While the latter are concerned with other governmental institutions and the Court’s relationship with those institutions, the former are self-regarding or even “self-interested” to
borrow a phrase from Justice Blackmun,284 in that the Court
considers them in the context of how federal courts themselves
will be impacted by an increase in litigation. Moreover, with
other-regarding floodgates arguments, the concern is not about
284

McMillian, 503 US at 15 (Blackmun concurring).
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case volume per se, but rather that an increase in cases will
show that congressional will was disregarded or will mean keeping members of the executive branch from performing their official obligations. By contrast, the concern with court-centered
floodgates arguments is precisely about volume—that the federal courts will have additional cases to decide (which is, of course,
precisely their official obligation).
To be sure, judicial workload is a critical concern. As noted
earlier, the lower courts have faced rising caseloads over the last
several decades285—a fact the justices have emphasized.286 Today, both federal district and appellate judges must contend
with hundreds of filings per year,287 meaning that their ability to
give attention to individual cases is greatly reduced. Employing
the tools at hand, district judges have come to rely more heavily
on the aid of magistrate judges,288 and appellate judges have
come to rely on the assistance of staff attorneys and other
case-management tools to cope with their workload.289 Still,
judges and scholars alike have called for an expansion of the
bench290 and limiting the flow of cases291 to alleviate the strain on
the federal courts. Thus, when the justices express their desire
to avoid inviting new claims into federal courts, the underlying
concern is not a trivial one.292 The critical question, though, is
285 See notes 148–49 and accompanying text. See also Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time across
Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 Geo Wash L Rev 401, 407–09 (2013).
286 See, for example, Bivens, 403 US at 428 (Black dissenting) (describing how the
courts are “choked with lawsuits”).
287 See note 151.
288 See generally Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the
Federal Courts, 39 Valp U L Rev 661 (2005) (discussing the increased role of magistrate
judges).
289 See Levy, 61 Duke L J at 320–25 (cited in note 35).
290 See Stephen Reinhardt, Developing the Mission: Another View, 27 Conn L Rev
877, 880 (1995); William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L Rev 273, 299
(1996).
291 See generally Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59
Cornell L Rev 634 (1974) (outlining various ways the case flow to the courts could be reduced, including creating a Court of Tax Appeals and eliminating diversity jurisdiction).
See also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 176 (Harvard 1985);
Wilfred Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction an Idea Whose Time Has Passed?, 61 NY Bar
J 14, 14–15 (July 1989); Edith H. Jones, Book Review, Back to the Future for Federal
Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 Tex L
Rev 1485, 1501–03 (1995); Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U Chi L Rev 761, 771–76 (1989).
292 Several Justices have described the problems attendant with a high caseload.
See United States v Timmreck, 441 US 780, 784 (1979) (“[I]ncreasing the volume of judicial
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whether considerations of judicial workload can stand as an independent factor in shaping the Court’s interpretation of substantive law.
As with evaluating other floodgates arguments, one way to
begin to assess the normative validity of self-regarding floodgates arguments is to ask whether the argument in question has
ties to a particular constitutional principle or resembles established areas of doctrine and practice. Ultimately, the answer
seems to be no. Unlike the arguments raised in the interbranch
and intersystemic contexts, those raised here have neither clear
constitutional support nor close theoretical or doctrinal analogues. Accordingly, reliance on these arguments requires some
sort of affirmative justification—a justification that the justices
have yet to produce.
Beginning with constitutional principles, it is unclear just
what provision in the constitution could justify using workload
concerns as an independent basis to alter substantive law or decline to hear a case. Perhaps in extreme situations—for example, if a particular interpretation of a statute would create hundreds of thousands of new claims each year—the Court might be
able to appeal to Article III itself. The rationale would be that
such a decision would effectively amount to halting the functioning of the judiciary—arguably a violation of the Constitution’s
provision for a federal court system.293 Short of this kind of catastrophic scenario, however, it is difficult to determine how the
Court could justify altering its interpretation of substantive law
with reference to a constitutional principle.
It is likewise difficult to discern just how court-centered
floodgates arguments could be grounded in established doctrine
and practice. To be sure, the Court has occasionally decided cases in particular ways out of fear of potential consequences. But
even when examining the closest examples of these sorts of
work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice.”), quoting
United States v Smith, 440 F2d 521, 528–29 (7th Cir 1971) (Stevens dissenting); Bivens,
403 US at 429 (Black dissenting) (“Many criminal defendants do not receive speedy trials
and neither society nor the accused are assured of justice when inordinate delays occur”);
Stern, 131 S Ct at 2630 (Breyer dissenting) (defining the problems of increased litigation
as “inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering among [the
parties]”).
293 Specifically, Article III states that: “The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.” As the Court itself has said, “Article III creates
. . . a judicial department composed of ‘inferior Courts’ and ‘one supreme Court.’” Plaut v
Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 227 (1995) (emphasis omitted).
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prudential cases, it is still evident that court-centered floodgates
arguments have no true analogue.
One line of cases that could at first seem promising for
grounding floodgates arguments are those based on institutional
capacity concerns. In these cases, the justices’ concern that a
particular holding will take them outside of their institutional
competency directly affects the outcome of the case. A prime example of this kind of case is San Antonio Independent School
District v Rodriguez,294 which involved an Equal Protection challenge to Texas’s system for funding its public schools.295 The majority acknowledged that its concerns about institutional competency—such as its lack of knowledge about local taxation
schemes and school management—affected its interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause (and subsequent decision that Texas’s funding scheme did not violate the Clause).296 On the surface, this kind of institutional capacity argument could appear to
be similar to a court-centered floodgates argument. After all,
both involve the Court interpreting substantive law in a particular way so as to avoid giving the federal courts certain kinds of
obligations.
And yet, there are quite plainly critical differences between
the two types of arguments. Specifically, the two have fundamentally different animating concerns. While it is true that the
Court in a case like Rodriguez is concerned with the kind of additional work the lower courts would have to take on, the primary reason for this concern is that such work would amount to
getting into the weeds of a state public school and taxation system, forcing the courts to encroach upon the territory of the legislature. In the words of Justice Powell, “[t]he consideration and
initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation
and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes
of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.”297
What these comments help show is that this type of institutional capacity argument is, at least largely, other regarding.
The underlying concern is that by deciding a case in a particular

294

411 US 1 (1973).
Id at 4–6.
296 Id at 41–44. See also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212, 1218 (1978); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 Yale L J 330, 338 (2006).
297 Rodriguez, 411 US at 58.
295
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way, the courts will be forced to go outside of their areas of expertise and necessarily encroach upon the territory of another
branch of government in that specific case. This is simply a fundamentally different concern than that the courts’ own workload
could become too great because of a subsequent increase in the
volume of cases.
A second line of prudential cases—those based on concerns
about the Court’s legitimacy—arguably comes closer to grounding court-centered floodgates arguments, but still remains analytically distinct. In these cases, the Court relies upon concerns
about maintaining its own legitimacy as an independent prudential factor in reaching a decision. The most direct example of
this kind of argument can be seen in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey,298 in which Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter suggested that maintaining the
Court’s legitimacy was a valid reason to avoid overruling past
precedent (and indeed, why the Court let its prior decision in
Roe v Wade299 stand).300 Once again, on the surface, one can see
parallels between this kind of argument and court-centered
floodgates arguments. Both involve the Court reaching a particular decision out of what is arguably institutional self-interest.
That said, there is still a significant space between these
two types of arguments. The Court has only openly301 appealed
to legitimacy concerns when it has claimed—as in Casey—that
the power of the institution was truly at stake.302 In the words of
the plurality, overruling their prior decision in Roe absent “the
most compelling reason” would “subvert the Court’s legitimacy
beyond any serious question.”303 With court-centered floodgates
arguments, the concern is not nearly so severe. Despite the fact
that the justices speak of “opening the floodgates,” the suggestion from the cases is that, at worst, there will be a problematic
accretion of cases (and therefore of work) over time, but not that
298

505 US 833 (1992).
410 US 113 (1973).
300 Casey, 505 US at 865–69.
301 There have been other decisions that commentators and scholars have considered to be influenced at least partially by a desire to enhance the Court’s legitimacy—
most recently Sebelius. See, for example, A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts
Court at Seven, 98 Va L Rev In Brief 76, 89–90 (2012).
302 Casey, 505 US at 867. See also Richard H. Fallon Jr, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 Cal L Rev 1,
27–28 (2003); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22, 70–71 (1992).
303 Casey, 505 US at 867.
299
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the courts will imminently face a true catastrophe. Again, short
of a decision that would result in a cataclysmic situation for the
courts—say by leading to tens or hundreds of thousands of new
claims—court-centered floodgates arguments are clearly distinct
from those based on the Court’s own legitimacy as voiced in
Casey.
In short, while one could readily identify related doctrine or
even constitutional principles in the context of other-regarding
floodgates arguments that suggested the consideration of these
arguments was legitimate, the same cannot be said of floodgates
arguments in the court-centered context. With this latter set, it
is unclear just what kind of legal footing, if any, these arguments could have. Accordingly, these arguments need some sort
of affirmative normative justification—a justification that the
justices have yet to offer. Until such a justification can be offered, the Court should be wary of considering court-centered
floodgates concerns in shaping the “requirements of law.”304
Now, it is important to recognize that counseling Courts
against considering caseload volume in this kind of decision
making does not mean that there is no recourse when it comes to
docket concerns. Our system provides several ways to relieve
caseload pressure short of the courts not recognizing causes of
action or deciding not to hear particular sets of cases. Specifically, our constitutional system gives Congress the authority to adjust laws so as to stem that flow.305 And Congress has indeed exercised that power. As noted earlier, Congress passed the
Supreme Court Case Selections Act306 to alleviate the Court’s
then “unmanageable workload” by eliminating most of the
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.307 With respect to the rest of the
federal court docket, Congress has repeatedly enacted targeted
legislation to reduce frivolous filings. For example, Congress
passed the PLRA precisely as a way of “addressing a flood of
prisoner litigation in the federal courts.”308 Similarly, part of the
purpose of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995309 was to limit frivolous securities claims.310 This is not to

304

Palmer, 468 US at 554 n 30 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Furthermore, Congress, of course, has the power to create additional judgeships,
which would serve to reduce the burden on any single judge.
306 Pub L No 100-352, 102 Stat 662.
307 See Watts, 160 U Penn L Rev at 13–14 (cited in note 152).
308 Woodford v Ngo, 548 US 81, 91–92 n 2 (2006).
309 Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737, codified at 15 USC § 78(a) et seq.
305
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suggest that Congress could not do more in this vein; rather the
point is simply that there is still a branch of government that
has the clear authority to take the courts’ caseload into account
in substantive decision making and has done so repeatedly in
the past.
This does not leave the courts defenseless against the rising
tide, however; they have many tools besides substantive law
with which to keep themselves afloat. Perhaps most prominently, both the district courts and the courts of appeals can avail
themselves of various procedural rules to help cope with, and
indeed limit, their dockets. Most plainly, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure employ what have been called three basic pretrial “discouragement mechanisms.”311 The first mechanism is
the pleading stage itself, with the possibility for a motion to
dismiss. Although pleadings obviously have several purposes,
scholars have come to identify a significant one as “allowing a
court to screen cases for merit.”312 At this juncture, courts can siphon off some of the frivolous cases that come before them. The
second mechanism is summary judgment. The main goal of Rule
56 has been said to be “filtering out cases not worthy of trial,”313
and that rule is now regarded as a “powerful tool for judges to
control dockets.”314 A third mechanism is the possibility of Rule
11 sanctions, which were developed to “punish lawyers for advancing meritless contentions that wasted the courts’ attention”315 and to deter such litigation from coming into court in the
first place.316 In short, the district courts have at their disposal
310 Securities Litigation Reform: Conference Report to Accompany HR 1058, HR Conf
Rep No 104-369, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 44 (1995).
311 Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 NC L Rev 1023, 1033–34 (1989).
312 David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 Georgetown L J 117, 123 (2010).
See also Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan L Rev 1293, 1347 (2010)
(“Scholars have broken down the purpose of pleadings in a number of different ways, but
they might broadly be characterized as: notice-giving, process-facilitating, and meritsscreening.”).
313 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 NYU L Rev 982, 1041 (2003).
314 Id at 1056.
315 Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 Duke L J 597, 611 (2010).
316 FRCP 11, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendments (“Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions
when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline
the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.”).
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several critical procedural rules that have been fashioned, at
least in part, so that district courts can more quickly dispose of
frivolous filings and streamline the litigation process more
generally.
Many of the mechanisms that exist at the district court level
have analogues at the courts of appeals. Through the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the circuit courts have several key
ways to manage their dockets and reduce the time taken by frivolous filings. Rule 34 permits appeals courts to decide cases
without oral argument317—a powerful time-saving mechanism.318
Additionally, courts of appeals can rely on staff attorneys to help
draft summary dispositions.319 Finally, per Rule 38, if a court of
appeals determines that a particular filing was frivolous, the
court can award damages and costs to the appellee.320
Moreover, these mechanisms of the federal courts are not
static—if they are insufficient to curb the flow of frivolous cases,
they can be altered, and indeed have been so altered in the past.
Rule 34, for example, was amended in 1979 to authorize the resolution of an appeal without oral argument whenever a panel
agrees that argument is unnecessary because, inter alia, an appeal is frivolous.321 Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
was amended in 1983 precisely to reduce the number of frivolous
filings.322
And although this has been more controversial, the Supreme Court itself has shifted the meaning of various procedural
rules in its own opinions.323 In 1986, the Court in a trilogy of cases324 solidified Rule 56 as “a powerful tool for the early resolution
317

See FRAP 34.
See Levy, 61 Duke L J at 323, 345–46 (cited in note 35). See also Honorable J.
Clifford Wallace, Improving the Appellate Process Worldwide through Maximizing Judicial Resources, 38 Vand J Transnatl L 187, 200 (2005) (“The amount of time saved by
foregoing oral argument is significant.”).
319 Wallace, 38 Vand J Transnatl L at 196–98 (cited in note 318).
320 See FRAP 38.
321 See FRAP 34, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1979 Amendments.
322 FRCP 11, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendment.
323 See, for example, Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility beyond the Complaint, 53 Wm &
Mary L Rev 987, 1014 (2012) (describing the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal as
“enormously controversial”), citing Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007) and
Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662 (2009); Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and
Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 849, 883–84 (2010) (critiquing Iqbal on the ground that changes to pleading standards should be made through
the Rules Enabling Act or Congress, not the Court).
324 Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317 (1986); Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US
242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 (1986).
318
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of litigation.”325 And of course, more recently, the Court altered
pleadings with its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly326
and Ashcroft v Iqbal.327 There can be disagreement about the
propriety of the way these rules have shifted over time, but the
point remains that the federal courts have an extensive set of
procedures to manage their dockets, and these procedures can
be ratcheted up if they prove insufficient.
What this discussion suggests is that, when compared to
floodgates arguments that express interbranch and intersystemic concerns, those that express court-centered concerns are on
significantly shakier ground. Barring a true flood of tens or
hundreds of thousands of cases, no evident principle exists to
support the Court taking workload concerns into account when
engaging in “[i]nterpretation of the law.”328 Therefore, although
the Court may have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the
number of filings, and particularly frivolous filings, does not become too high, it should be wary of using substantive law as the
limiting device. Speaking of unmeritorious cases in particular,
Justice Stevens has argued, “Frivolous cases should be treated
as exactly that, and not as occasions for fundamental shifts in
legal doctrine. Our legal system has developed procedures for
speedily disposing of unfounded claims; if they are inadequate
. . . then there is something wrong with those procedures, not
with the law.”329 Accordingly, the Court should have a presumption against using court-centered floodgates arguments. The
problems of case flow should be addressed through case management and, more broadly, the tools of Congress.
This discussion leads to another question: Does the presumption against court-centered floodgates arguments extend to
cases in which the Court is essentially engaging in federal common lawmaking? One could imagine that although it is difficult
325 Miller, 78 NYU L Rev at 984 (cited in note 313). It is worth noting that according
to several empirical studies, in almost all categories of cases the summary judgment
rates began to increase prior to the Court’s decision in the trilogy of cases. See generally
Joe S. Cecil, et al, A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J Empirical Legal Stud 861 (2007); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials
and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J Empirical Legal Stud 591 (2004).
326 550 US 544 (2007).
327 556 US 662 (2009).
328 Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 545 (2001) (“Interpretation of the
law and the Constitution is the primary mission of the judiciary when it acts within the
sphere of its authority to resolve a case or controversy.”).
329 Hoover v Ronwin, 466 US 558, 601 (1984) (Stevens dissenting).
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to justify the Court using workload concerns as a reason to alter
its interpretation of substantive law, the Court could legitimately take that same consideration into account when its role is to
make a policy judgment rather than interpret the law, as in the
Bivens line of cases.330 After all, if the goal of the Court in this
context is simply to make good law, then the consideration of future litigation might well be relevant in the determination of
what constitutes a good law.
The normative assessment of floodgates arguments thus far
has been partially relativistic—some arguments are more or less
easily defensible when compared to others, and a court-centered
argument in this context is no exception. Considering workload
in a policy context is easier to justify than using court-centered
floodgates concerns as stand-alone grounds for a decision, but it
is not altogether unproblematic. To borrow another legal trope,
one concern is based on a slippery slope. If the Court relies on
floodgates considerations in a policy-making context, these same
concerns are more likely to bleed into its substantive analysis in
other cases. But the greater point may be that, in light of the
various legitimate options for managing caseload that are open
to the judiciary, even when engaging in policy analysis it might
be preferable for the Court to shy away from using caseload as a
reason to shift the direction of the law.
C.

Empirical Concerns

The outset of this Part poses several normative questions
about floodgates arguments, including whether it is ever appropriate for courts to consider the effect their decision will have on
the volume of litigation and if so, how many cases are necessary
to create an impermissible flood in any given context. The preceding Sections have tried to frame and begin to answer the first
of these questions, suggesting that the use of other-regarding
floodgates arguments is generally defensible, whereas the Court
should be wary of relying on court-centered floodgates arguments, particularly when outside the policy-making context.
This Section turns to the second of these questions—what precisely is needed to make the case for an oncoming flood? It is important to recognize that answering this question, in turn, involves a critical two part task: a court must not only forecast the
amount of litigation (a more or less empirical proposition) but
330

See note 173.
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also say why that amount would constitute a flood instead of a
permissible flow. It is worth briefly considering each task here.
Beginning with the purely empirical component, the preceding discussion reveals that the justices often invoke floodgates
arguments without much support for why they believe a large
number of cases will come. In Bivens, Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court’s decision would “open[ ] the door for another avalanche of new federal cases” on the theory that
“[w]henever a suspect imagines, or chooses to assert, that a
Fourth Amendment right has been violated, he will now immediately sue the federal officer in federal court”331 and nothing
more. In Solem, Chief Justice Burger claimed that the Court’s
decision to hold the petitioner’s sentence unconstitutional would
lead to a “flood” of new cases with no additional support.332
Of course, it can be easy to hide one’s claims behind this
kind of hyperbole—and there is reason to suspect that parties
and justices have invoked this language at times precisely because, in the words of Justice Powell, a “‘floodgates’ argument
can be easy to make and difficult to rebut.”333 But if a particular
decision is made to avoid an influx of cases that could harm a
coordinate branch of government or state court, then it should
be based on something more than the suggestion that an “avalanche” or “flood” is imminent.
Forecasting the number of cases that will follow a decision
is no easy task and may be near impossible in some cases. For
example, if one of the justices had been willing to accept the
basic principle of President Clinton’s argument in Jones, that
justice then would have needed to show why a decision by the
Court not to stay civil litigation against the President would
“spawn” a host of new litigation334—a particularly difficult undertaking given the sui generis nature of the case. But outside of
a unique case such as Jones, we should expect the justices to
have some extended discussion about why they think a flood is
likely to come. This reasoning could be based on past experience
with the same kind of claims, as in Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians335 and Skinner,336 or experience with comparable
331

Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting).
Solem, 463 US at 315 (Burger dissenting).
333 Rummel v Estelle, 445 US 263, 304 (1980) (Powell dissenting).
334 Jones, 520 US at 701–02.
335 Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US at 680–81 n 11 (“We observed
no flood of litigation in the first 20 years of operation of Part B of the Medicare program,
and we seriously doubt that we will be inundated in the future.”).
332
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claims, as in Bivens.337 Now to be clear, the point of this prescription is not to encourage the justices to become empiricists
(an important caveat given that there will certainly be skepticism about the ability of the Court to make these kinds of forecasts even outside the most challenging cases338). Rather, the
point is that if claims about increases in litigation are to influence at least some decisions, the justices need to provide support
for those claims—both for each other and for the public.
Second, it is important to recognize that the final part of the
Court’s task goes beyond mere forecasting. A floodgates argument rests on a claim about how many cases would follow a particular decision, but then also a claim about why that number
would actually create a burden. Hypothetically, the Court could
accurately predict the number of new cases that will stem from
the case before it—be it, say, one thousand or even ten thousand
per year—yet this number still must be set in context. Specifically, the justices must still make a determination about whether the figure will truly be problematic.
To see how challenging this can be, one need only look to a
recent study of Bivens cases—one of the sets of cases that concerned the Court. The study showed that between 2001 and
2003, Bivens suits constituted 243 out of 143,092 civil filings in
five district courts.339 Do 243 filings rise to the level of a flood
within these district courts? It is difficult to say. But if a justice
claims that it does, then that justice should make that case, presumably based on context-specific information, such as how
much time these cases consume and ultimately the extent to
which they tend to prevent law enforcement officials from performing their jobs.
336 Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299 (“In the Circuits that currently allow § 1983 claims for
DNA testing, no evidence tendered . . . shows any litigation flood or even rainfall.”) (citation omitted).
337 Bivens, 403 US at 391 n 4 (“In estimating the magnitude of any such ‘avalanche,’
it is worth noting that a survey of comparable actions against state officers under . . .
§ 1983 found only 53 reported cases in 17 years (1951–1967) that survived a motion to
dismiss.”).
338 See, for example, Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, What Are the Facts of
Marbury v. Madison?, 20 Const Commen 255, 281 & n 74 (2003) (suggesting that one
might “think that judges are not particularly good at predicting the future consequences
of their decisions”).
339 See Reinert, 62 Stan L Rev at 837 (cited in note 154). Specifically, Professor Alexander Reinert noted that fifty-one Bivens actions were filed in the Southern District of
New York, sixty-seven in the Eastern District of New York, sixty-four in the Southern
District of Texas, twenty-three in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and thirty-eight
in the Northern District of Illinois between 2001 and 2003. Id.
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In short, even when the consideration of a particular type of
floodgates argument is generally defensible, an individual argument can still be problematic as employed. This discussion
has shown that when the justices invoke floodgates arguments,
they often do so without much support for why a flood will come
or why a particular high-water mark is problematic. While these
areas are ripe for further scholarly exploration, at the very least
one can conclude at this juncture that if the justices are to continue to put forward these arguments, they should do more on
both fronts.
CONCLUSION
When the Court first consistently began using floodgates
rhetoric in the mid-1940s, little did it know that it would be
opening the floodgates of floodgates arguments themselves.
Since 2000, the justices have considered floodgates arguments in
nearly thirty cases, with fourteen coming from the last few years
alone.340 This flood shows no sign of receding anytime soon.
In light of the Court’s consistent—and even increasing—
discussion of floodgates arguments, exploring and understanding them is vital. Though courts and scholars often refer to “the
floodgates argument” as if it had a singular, stable meaning, it
can be invoked in various ways, depending upon who is being
flooded, the effect of that flood, and what the flood contains. As
this Article has demonstrated, the Court has considered floodgates arguments made to avoid unduly burdening the executive,
encroaching upon the legislature, or upsetting the balance between the federal and state courts. These are common concerns
that the Court often encounters, and they have ties to the principles of separation of powers and federalism, as well as the doctrines of qualified immunity and abstention. Although the justices should take care to support claims that a flood will truly
ensue when making other-regarding floodgates arguments, the
use of such arguments is generally defensible.
The same cannot be said for court-centered floodgates arguments—those arguments in which the Court is concerned
about its own workload and the workload of the rest of the judiciary. Although the caseload of the federal courts is a critical issue, attempts to reduce it through the interpretation of substantive law raise serious concerns. Short of a catastrophic situation,
340
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anxieties about caseload would do well to be addressed through
Congress and the lower courts’ case-management tools.
Ultimately, what seemed to be an innocuous line of argumentation implicated broad questions about when the Court
should consider the consequences of its decisions, how the Court
should engage with empirics, and what measures the Court can
undertake to ensure its own ability to administer justice. These
and related questions all deserve sustained scholarly and judicial consideration. But based on this preliminary analysis, it is
clear that the justices should guard their own decisions to ensure that workload concerns, as manifested in the court-centered
floodgates arguments above, do not spill over into the substantive analysis of law.

